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A. The Research Problem 
The issue of discrimination in residential mortgage lending has received a great 
deal of attention. Numerous reports in the popular press have addressed the issue and the 
evidence consistently suggests denial rates for home loans are higher for minorities than 
for nonminorities. 1 Public officials have reacted strongly to the appearance of widespread 
racial discrimination in mortgage lending. The press reports prompted investigations by 
the Justice Department and the House Banking Committee (Cocheo (1993)). The Clinton 
administration and banking regulators have made public statements which indicate deep 
concern about racial discrimination in the extension of credit (Cocheo (1993) and Bacon 
(1993)). The possibility of widespread racial discrimination in mortgage lending has 
serious public policy implications for the regulation of the financial system and the 
management of financial institutions that extend mortgage credit. 
Much of the attention can be attributed to the analysis of the data reported as a 
result of the 1989 and 1991 amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA).2 The HMDA requires mortgage lenders to compile and report data from home 
1 The Washington Post reported white neighborhoods receive twice as many mortgage 
loans as black neighborhoods with equivalent income levels (Brenner and Spayd (1993)). 
A similar analysis of the Atlanta mortgage market came to the same conclusion (Atlanta 
Constitution (1994). 
2 An analysis by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank ofHMDA data indicated that 
minorities are denied loans at twice the rate of nonminorities, even when factors such as 
income are held constant (Munnell, et. al. (1996)). 
1 
purchase and home improvement loan applications. These disclosures are meant to help 
authorities identify discriminatory lending practices and enforce the following statutes: 
(1) the Fair Housing Act, (2) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and (3) the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). However, the accurate investigation of possible 
discrimination in lending with HMDA data is a complex problem because several crucial 
factors in the credit decision not included in theHMDA data are highly correlated with 
race.3 
Recent statements from policymakers in Washington indicate that performance-
based standards will be used to assess lenders' performance in extending credit to 
minorities (England (1993)). President Clinton has indicated that lenders should be 
evaluated by their performance rather than .their effort in lending to minorities (England 
(1993)). Critics argue that performance-based standards are a move toward lending 
quotas and equal outcomes for all races, regardless of credit quality (England (1993)). 
Equal outcome lending will accomplish the social goal of eliminating racial 
disparities in lending. The cost of this type oflending program to society depends on 
. whether the racial disparities that exist are due primarily to .discrimination or whether 
they occur because nonminority applicants tend to be more creditworthy than minority 
applicants. 
Disparities in credit extensionto minorities and nonminorities could result from 
three basic·causes. First, disparities colild reslilt from lenders having a "taste for 
3 Munnell, et. al. (1996) find evidence that blacks are more likely to have lower net 
worths, higher monthly obligations to income ratios, and worse credit histories than 
nonminorities. 
2 
discrimination."4 This implies lenders deny profitable loans to minority applicants to 
satisfy their "taste for discrimination." This type of discrimination is inconsistent with 
the concept of owner wealth maximization and. damages both shareholders and 
customers. It is also inconsistent with recent empirical evidence which indicates that 
highly qualified minority borrowers are just as likely to receive mortgage money as 
highly qualified white borrowers (Hunter and Walker (1995)). 
Second, disparities in credit extensfori between minorities and nonminorities may 
. . . . .· 
be the result of owner wealth maximizing behavior by lenders. Lenders should approve 
. .. . 
all positive risk-adjusted NPV loans to maximize .shareholder wealth. lfnonminorities 
tend to be more creditworthy than minotitfe~. lending firms pursuing owner wealth 
maximizing decision.swill make fewer loans to minorities than to·nonminorities. The 
lending firm does not reject positive risk-adjusted NPV loans because of prejudice, but 
the process results in racial disparities in lending decisions. 
The case of owner wealth maximizing credit decisions which result in racial 
disparities in credit extension raises the classic dilemma of credit rationing. Society must 
decide through the political process how adjustments should be made to redirect credit to 
preferred sectors of the economy. If privately owned lenders are asked to make loans to 
borrowers with higher default risk at market rates, the costs will be borne by the bank's 
. . 
owners and/or other customers assuming no government subsidies are given. 
4 Becker (1971) argues that individuals with a ''taste for discrimination" willingly forego 
profitable investment opportunities to avoid conducting business with minorities . 
. 3 
Third, racial disparities in lending decisions could result from statistical 
discrimination.5 Statistical discriminatiori occurs when a lender either uses race as a 
proxy for creditworthiness or uses variables highly correlated with race that do not 
. . . 
accurately reflect credit risk as proxies for creditworthiness.6 Statistical discrimination 
results in higher loan denial rates for minority borrowers than are justified based on 
relevant measures of credit quality. . 
. . Statistical discrimination may orm~y not be intentional. If lenders use race as a 
proxy for creditworthiness, the discrimination is intentional. Unintentional statistical 
discrimination can result from a faulty credit decision model. If extraneous variables are 
included in the credit decision model :that do not influence default risk, some positive 
risk-adjusted NPV loans may be.rejected/ If.these extraneous variables are correlated 
with race, the distortions caused by the model wiU impact minorities disproportionately. 
The result is statistical discrimination and iending :that does not maximize owner wealth 
because positive risk-adjusted NPV loans are rejected. 
5 Statistical discrimination is a term that has been used by many researchers to refer to 
lenders using unsuitable proxies for credit risk that result in higher denial rates for 
minority borrowers. See for example, Longhofer {1996), and Ferguson and .Peters 
(1997) . 
. 6 This type of discrimination is referred to legally as disparate impact discrimination. 
Disparate impact discrimination occurs "when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all 
applicants but the practice is not justified by business necessity," and it has a 
disproportionate impact on a protected group (Bauer and Cromwell (1994)). 
7 Lenders may believe these extraneous variables influence default risk. Therefore, they 
feel justified in including the variables. The statistical discrimination that results from 
the model is unintentional. 
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Unintentional statistical discrimination resulting from.an erroneous credit decision 
process can be corrected if lenders use only those factors that accurately reflect the 
probability of default. This will eliminate the problems associated with extraneous 
economic factors that are highly correlated with race but racial disparities will still exist if 
economic factors that truly reflect the probability of default are highly correlated with 
race. 
The ideal·solutionto this problem would be a credit decision model which 
contains only those variables required to accurately reflect the probability of default but 
no variables that would produce racial disparities in the loan decisions. The existence of 
an owner wealth maximizing, equal outcome credit model is dependent on the degree of 
correlation of race with economic variables that accurately reflect default risk. 
If nonminority borrowers have higher average credit quality than minority 
borrowers, an owner wealth maximizing. lending model will have higher loan approval 
rates for nonminority borrowers than for minority borrowers. If this is the case, 
perfonnance-based standards encouraging equal outcomes will lead to lending that is not 
owner wealth maximizing. Policymakers should consider the costs of implementing 
these standards. 
The research problem is to empirically explore the possibility of a realistic credit 
decision model that selects all positive NPV loans without producing racial disparities in 
loan decisions. If race is highly correlated with important default variables, then the ideal 
owner wealth maximizing, equal outcome model will probably not exist. The existence 
of an owner wealth maximizing, equal outcome model is ultimately an empirical question 
5 
and is the critical question addressed in this research. Given the possibility that an ideal 
credit decision model does not really exist, what is the cost of equal outcome lending? 
B. Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to develop an empirical owner wealth maximizing 
credit decision model for mortgage loans which can be adjusted to prevent racial 
disparities in lending decisions. The equal outcome model is compared to the model that 
accepts all risk-adjusted positive NPV loans, regardless ofracial disparities. If both 
models predict loan defaults equally well, this would be evidence supporting the 
possibility of an owner wealth maximizing, equal outcome mortgage lending model. If a 
difference is detected,in default prediction, the costs and benefits of the two models can 
be compared. 
C. Structure of the Research 
First, a theoretical model of the credit extension decision that accepts all positive 
risk-adjusted NPV loans is developed. This theoretical model does not address the issue 
of racial disparities. Only those factors that theory indicates should affect loan approvals 
are included, regardless oftheir possible correlation with race. Next, the theoretical 
model is estimated empirically with a set of loan approval data to test the performance of 
the owner wealth maximizing model in reducing racial disparities in loan approvals. A 
second empirical model is developed by testing all possible subsets of the owner wealth 
maximizing model to find a model that eliminates racial disparities in loan approvals. 
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Finally, the two models are estimated with a new data set that is based on loan 
defaults. The cost of using the equal outcome model is any decline in default prediction 
rates from using the equal outcome model instead of the owner wealth maximizing model 
and the benefits are considered to be any decline in the racial disparity in loan approvals 
from using the equal outcome model instead of the owner wealth maximizing model. 
This research does not try to measure the social benefits of a political economic 
policy that requires equal lending across all racial groups. Such a policy would certainly 
provide benefits to some segments of society, but the benefits to society as a whole would 
depend on how equal lending across racial groups is achieved. 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II is a review of the previous 
research on discrimination in mortgage lending, Chapter III reviews the previous research 
on loan default models, Chapter IV develops a theoretical .framework for credit decisions 
that maximize owner wealth, Chapter,V describes the empirical analysis and the 
hypotheses, Chapter VI presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Chapter VII 
develops the final conclusions and implications of the research. 
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CHAPTER II. 
THE EVIDENCE ON DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING 
This chapter reviews the evidence on discrimination in mortgage lending. It is 
well known that there are racial disparities in residential mortgage loan originations and 
that upper-income neighborhoods receive significantly more residential mortgage loans 
(measured both in the number ofloans and the dollar amount ofloans) than lower-income 
neighborhoods. Canner and Passmore (.1995) review the 1993 Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and report that 90 percent of the total home purchase loans 
and 92 percent of the total dollar-amount of home purchase loans are made in middle- and 
upper-income neighborhoods. They, find the ratio of home· purchase loans to the number 
of owner occupied housing units is significantly lower in low-income neighborhoods than 
in upper-income neighborhoods .. Canner and Passmore.(1995) also report rejection rates 
of22.25percent for black applicants applying for government-insured loans and 34;02 
percent for black applicants applying for conventional loans. The rejection rates for 
white applicants are reported to be 11.78 percent for government-insured loans and 15.33 
percent for conventional loans. Canner,.Passmore and Smith (1994) review the 1992 
HMDA data and report siinilarresults. The data suggest that black applicants have 
significantly higher rejection rates than white applicants and that low-income 
neighborhoods receive significantly less m.ortgage,money than upper-income 
neighborhoods. Are these disparities the result of discrimination, differences in the 
quality of applicants based on objective economic criteria, or both? That is the question 
that credit discrimination research attempts to answer. 
8 
A. · Theories of Credit Rationing andDiscrimination in Mortgage Lending 
Credit rationing occurs when lenders charge a bank-optimal interest rate that is 
below the market-clearing interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981 )). When lenders charge 
the same rate to all borrowers and that rate is below the market-clearing level, some 
applicants will be rationed out of the credit market. Lenders must be able to differentiate 
low-risk applicants from high-risk applicants to ensure that high-risk applicants will be 
rationed out of the market and low-risk applicants will obtain loans. 
Nesiba (1996) provides an example of credit rationing when there are two 
distinguishable groups of borrowers. Nesiba (1996) assumes the two groups of borrowers 
.are white borrowers and black borrowers. Assume the bank sets a bank-optimal interest 
rate below the market clearing level so that some borrowers will be rationed out of the 
mortgage market. Further assume that the projects of black and white borrowers have 
equal expected returns but the projects of black borrowers have a higher average variance. 
If the bank-optimal interest rate is low enough, Nesiba{1996) argues that no black 
borrowers will be given loans until most (or all) of the white borrowers are given loans. 
Nesiba (1996) theorizes that the combination of imperfect information and two distinct 
groups with different average risk may lead to rational discrimination against the group 
with higher average risk. In the context of credit rationing, this is not discrimination. 
Black borrowers are simply rationed out of the market because they are, on average, 
higher credit risks. 
Credit rationing of the type just described may be rational, but it is also illegal. 
This type of discrimination has come to be known as rational or statistical discrimination. 
9 
Statistical discrimination occurs when a lender uses an attribute, such as race, as a proxy 
for creditworthiness. The true creditworthiness of the borrower is not influenced by race, 
but race is correlated with unobservable factors of creditworthiness. Therefore, lenders 
may use race as an inexpensive proxy for the unobservable factors of creditworthiness. 
Becker (1971) argues that some individuals have a taste for discrimination. These 
individuals are willing to pay or forfeit income to keep from associating with certain 
groups of people. Becker (1971) develops a model of the labor market with 
discrimination of this type. 
Nesiba (1996) extends the Becker model of "taste-based" discrimination to the 
mortgage market. Assume lenders make loans with expected repayment R, based on the 
principal amount of the loan, P, and the interest rate charged on the loan, i: 
R=P(l + i). 
Nesiba (1996) states that discrimination.would result in minority borrowers being . 
charged a higher interest rate, i* > i. The difference between the rate charged to minority 
borrowers and the rate charged to white borrowers (i* - i) is the discrimination 
coefficient. The cost of discriminaticm is P(i* -}) and is paid by the person being 
discriminated against. Tlie cost to the discriminating lerider would be thie income lost 
from minority applicants that drop out·ofthe applicant pool as a result of being.charged a 
higher interest rate; · 
As Nesiba (1996) points out, the Becker theory of discrimination assumes a 
perfectly competitive market. In this perfectly competitive market, if lenders 
discriminate against minorities by charging higher interest rates, nondiscriminating 
10 
competitors will enter the market and make loans to minorities at competitive interest 
rates. The effect is that any discrimination against minorities must be temporary. It 
cannot continue in the long-term in a perfectly competitive market. 
Becker (1993) argues that, iflenders have a taste for discrimination, minority 
borrowers will be held to a higher standard than white borrowers. The result should be 
that minorities will have lower default ratesthanwhite borrowers. The empirical 
evidence suggests that black borrowers have higher default rates than white borrowers. 
Becker argues that the empiric~ evidence is inconsistent with discrimination against 
black borrowers. 
Notice, this is different from the argument made byNesiba, (1996). If the 
discrimination takes the form described by N esiba · ( 1996), the higher interest rate charged 
to minorities would increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 8 The result of 
this type of discrimination could very well be higher default rates for black borrowers, 
since high quality black applicants will drop out of the applicant pool. 
If discrimination takes the form described by Becker (1993), the result will be 
lower default rates for minorities only if certain conditions hold. Default rates will only 
be lower for minorities under this form of discrimination if white borrowers and minority 
borrowers ·have identical distributions of creditqual1ty. If white borrowers have higher 
distributions of credit quality than minority borrowers, minorities will have higher default 
8 It is not necessary for the minority borrowers to be charged a higher interest rate to 
increase problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. These problems will also exist 
if other costs of the loan increase, such as mortgage insurance premiums. 
11 
rates than white borrowers even if they are held to a higher standard in the loan approval 
process.9 
Calem and Stutzer (1995) develop an equilibrium model of credit rationing where 
minority applicants will have higher denial rates than white applicants and minority 
borrowers will have higher defaultrates than white borrowers. The authors assume that 
applicants ofvery high credit quality and very low credit quality are easily distinguished 
by lenders. Problems occur in evaluating applicants with intermediate (marginal) credit 
scores. Lenders are unable to clearly distinguish high risk applicants from low risk 
applicants within the intermediate credit scores. 
Calem and Stutzer (1995)assume high risk applicants have more to lose if their 
loan is denied due to their higher probability of default. Therefore, higher risk applicants 
are more willing to accept more expensive loans if it improves the chance of loan 
approval. This is consistent with previous models of credit rationing, such as Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981 ), where charging higher rates leads to a lower quality applicant pool. 
Calem and Stutzer (1995) assume some lenders offer higher cost loans while other 
lenders offer lower cost loans. 10 The authors also assume that lendersoffering higher.cost 
9 This relationship between default and denial rates is developed formally by Ferguson 
and Peters (1995). Tootell (1993), Browne and Tootell (1995), and Galster (1993) also 
make this point in responding to criticisms by Becker{1993). 
10 High cost loans may be FHA loans where the borrower must pay a mortgage insurance 
premium, while low cost loans may be conventional loans with loan-to-value ratios below 
80 percent. If the required downpayment is not considered a cost of the loan, FHA loans 
are significantly more costly than conventional loans with low loan-to-value ratios. 
Empirical evidence suggests that minority borrowers tend to be concentrated in the FHA 
loan program and that relatively few minorities receive conventional conforming loans. 
12 
loans will approve a higher percentage of the applicant pool than lenders offering lower. 
cost loans. Since high risk applicants have more to lose than low risk applicants if their 
loan application is denied, they will apply for the loan where they have the best chance of 
being approved. High risk applicants will apply for high risk loans and low risk 
applicants will apply for low risk loans. 
Since lenders can't distinguish between the.applicants with intermediate credit 
scores, they rely on any factors that will provide additional information about the 
probability of the applicant being a high risk applicant or a low risk applicant. If the 
lenders believe that relatively more high risk applicants are concentrated among minority 
applicants, the race of the applicant maybe used as.an additional signal of the applicant's 
creditworthiness. Lenders offering high cost loans will approve a higher percentage of 
loans to minorities because they are receiving a higher return formaking the riskier loans. . . . ' . 
Lenders offering low cost loans will use race as a signal and deny a high proportion of 
minority applicants. 
The result of minorities having high denial rates in the low cost loan category is 
that many low risk minority applicants are denied loans while many high risk minority 
applicants are approved loans: The rejection of loans to low risk minority applic~ts 
results in a high denial rate for minority applicants. The concentration of lending to high 
risk minority borrowers results in a high default rate. This model is consistent with the 
empirical evidence, which indicates that minority applicants have higher denial rates than 
white applicants and that minority borrowers have higher default rates than white 
13 
borrowers. Calem and Stutzer (1995) argue that higher default rates. among minority 
borrowers may be a direct result of this form of discrimination. 
Calomiris, Kahn, and Longhofer (1994) also develop a model where higher 
. . 
default rates for minority borrowers is consistent with disc.rimination against minorities in 
the mortgage market. In their model, discrimination occurs because information 
gathering is costly and lenders have a cultural affinity to white applicants. This cultural 
affinity to white.applicants makes It easier to assess the credit risk of white applicants. 
The model implicitly assumes that the determinants of credit risk may be different for 
white borrowers than for minority borrowers. In order to accurately assess the credit risk 
otmhiority borrowers, lenders must obtain additional costly information. 
Assume lenders can invest in signal technology s or t. Signal technology s is 
more efficient in estimating the credit quality of white applicants, W. Signal technology t 
is more efficient in estimating the credit quality of minority applicants, B. Both signal 
technologies are costly for lenders to obtain. 
Calomiris, et. al. (1994) argue that lenders are more likely to obtain signal 
technologys which makes them more efficient in underwriting loans to the majority of 
applicants, W. When underwriting loans to minority applicants, B, lenders must decide 
whether to use signal technology s or to invest additional funds to obtain signal 
. ' ' . . . . 
technology t. If the expected additional profits from underwriting minority loans with 
signal technology t are less than the cost of acquiring signal technology t, lenders will use 
signal technology s to underwrite all loans. 
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The result of using signal technology s to underwrite all loans is that more 
underwriting errors occur in evaluating minority applicants than white applicants. Since 
lenders know they will make more underwriting errors in evaluating minority applicants 
they may be more conservative in investing additional resources in processing marginal 
loan applications. They rely more on objective and inexpensive information to make loan 
decisions on minority applicants. Therefore, it is likely that a minority applicant and a 
white applicant with identical objective criteria will experience different loan outcomes. 
If the lender is more willing to invest in additional information to support the white 
applicant's loan application, the white applicant will be more likely to be approved for 
the loan than the minority applicant. Furthermore, if the lender believes that credit risk is 
correlated with race, the lender may use the applicant's race as an inexpensive proxy for 
creditworthiness. Calomiris et. al. (1994) show two consequences of using signal 
technology s to underwrite all loans instead of investing additional financial resources to 
obtain signal technology t: ( 1) minority applicants will have higher denial rates than 
white applicants, because lenders are more willing to consider compensating factors when 
underwriting white applicants and (2) the average probability of default is greater for 
minority borrowers because more underwriting errors for minority applicants will result 
in rejecting some of the creditworthy minorities and approving some of the 
uncreditworthy minority applicants. This results in lowering the quality of approved 
minority borrowers, and increasing default rates for minorities. 
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Ferguson and Peters (1995, 1997) also develop models where higher minority 
default rates may be consistent with discrimination. 11 Ferguson and Peters (1995) focus 
on the expected relationships of relative denial and default rates for minority and 
nonminority borrowers if the distribution of credit quality .is higher for nonminorities than 
for minorities and lenders have perfect information. Ferguson and Peters ( 1997) extend 
the model to show the impact of underwriting errors due to noise in the estimation of 
credit quality and the effect of cultural affinity by lenders as proposed by Calomiris et. al. 
(1994). 
Fergu~on and Peters (1995) develop a model oflending where the screening 
process results in a. ·~credit score." The probability the applicant will repay the loan is 
assumed to be a monotonically increasing function of this score, 8. For simplicity, they 
assume 8 is the probability oftepayment. A uniform nondiscriminatory lending policy 
will result in·approvingall loans where the creditworthiness of the borrower is above e· 
and denying loans if the score is below e·. All borrowers are charged the same interest 
rate. Assuming each loan is for $1, the bank receives (1 + r) if the borrower repays the 
loan. The expected profit on the loan is Sr - (1 - 8). The lender selects e· such that the 
. profit on a marginal loan is zero. 
Assume white applicants have a probability density function , g(8), and a 
cumulative distribution function, G(8), and black applicants have a probability density 
function, h(8), and a cumulativedistribution function, H(8). · Further, assume the 
11 The framework for the Ferguson and Peters (1995) model is majority and minority 
populations, not specifically white and black borrowers. They do, however, indicate their 
analysis can be clarified by thinking in terms of racial groups. 
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cumulative distribution function, G(8), first-order stochastically dominates the 
cumulative distribution function, H(8). Figure 1 shows the probability density functions 
h(8) and g(8). Given e·, the marginal credit score for all applicants, the average 
/\ 
creditworthiness of black borrowers is 8H and the average creditworthiness of white 
/\ 
borrowers is 8G. The marginal white borrowers and the marginal black borrowers have 
identical creditworthiness, but the average creditworthiness of white borrowers is higher 
than the average creditworthiness of black borrowers. From Figure 1, it is obvious 
that black borrowers will have higher denial rates than white borrowers under a uniform 
credit policy where all applicants with creditworthiness above e· are approved and all 
applicants with creditworthiness below e· are denied. 12 Also, because G(8) first-order 
I\ I\ 
stochastically dominates H(8) and 8H < 8G, black borrowers will have higher default 
rates than white borrowers. 13 Within this framework, Ferguson and Peters (1995) argue 
only two combinations of loan denial and default rate experiences can be viewed as 
discrimination. First, if white applicants exhibit lower denial rates and higher default 
rates than black applicants, there is evidence of discrimination against black applicants. 
Second, if white applicants have higher denial rates and lower default rates than black 
applicants, there is evidence of discrimination against white applicants. In a 
12 The area under the curve to the left of 8* · represents denied applications. The area 
under the probability density function, h(8), to the left of 8* is greater than the area under 
9* 9* 
the probability density function, g(8) to the left of 8* ( f h(8)d8 > f g(8)d8 ). 
0 0 
I\ 
13 The average default rate for black borrowers is 1 - 8h and the average default rate for 
I\ 









nondiscriminatory lending environment, Ferguson and Peters (1995) argue black 
applicants will have higher loan denial rates and higher loan default rates than white 
applicants. Observing that blacks have higher denial rates and higher default rates is not 
evidence of discrimination,reverse discrimination, or no discrimination. Ferguson and 
Peters (1995) state that no inferences can be made about discrimination under these 
conditions. 
Shaffer (1996) expands the theoretical analysis by Ferguson and Peters (1995) to 
allow unequal recovery rates on defaulted loans between white borrowers and black 
borrowers. Shaffer (1996) shows that, if recovery rates are significantly lower on 
defaulted loans made to black borrowers than on defaulted loans made to white 
borrowers, a profit-maximizing lending program may result in black borrowers having 
lower average default rates than white borrowers. 
The author's focus on recovery rates is a natural theoretical extension of Ferguson 
and Peters (1995), but its applicability to the residential loan market is questionable. 
There is no strong evidence that recovery rates are lower for black borrowers than for 
white borrowers. All Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans require government 
mortgage insurance and it is standard practice to require private mortgage insurance on 
conventional loans with loan to valueratios exceeding 80 percent. Tootell (1996) finds 
black borrowers are more likely to be required to get private mortgage insurance than 
identically qualified white borrowers. This evidence indicates white borrowers are more 
likely to be allowed to carry high loan-to-value ratios without private mortgage insurance 
than black borrowers. Therefore, it is possible that recovery rates may actually be 
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slightly lower on defaulted loans made to white b.orrowers than on defaulted loans made 
to black borrowers. 
Ferguson and Peters (1997) investigate the impact of underwriting.errors on 
marginal loan denial rates when the distribution of credit quality or the underwriting 
errors differ across racial groups. The authors assume all errors occur at the margin 
A . . 
where 8 is the minimum credit quality for loan approval and marginal borrowers have 
A A 
. credit quality ranging from 8 - E to 8 + E. 14 All applicants with true' credit quality below 
A A 
8 - E are correctly denied credit while all applicants with true credit quality above 8 + E 
. are correctly granted loans. Therefore, all underwriting errors occur in dealing with 
marginal applicants. Ferguson and Peters (1997) also assume that underwriting errors are 
symmetric.15 · 
Ferguson and Peters (1997) show that random underwriting mistakes will not 
impactwhite and minority borrowers to the same degree unless (1) credit quality is 
homogeneous, and (2) underwriting errors are not correlated with race. If either of these 
two conditions fails to hold, random underwriting mistakes may impact minorities 
disproportionately. 
14 Ferguson and Peters·(l997)use different notationthan Ferguson and Peters (1995). 
A 
Ferguson and Peters (1995) use 8* as the marginal cutoff point and 8 as the average 
A 
credit quality for approved borrowers. ·Ferguson and Peters (1997) use 8 as the marginal 
cutoff point and 8 as the average credit quality of all applicants, not just approved 
borrowers. 
15 A symmetric distribution of errors implies that a: lender is equally likely to understate 
or overstate an applicant's true.creditworthiness. 
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This analysis assumes that the majority of white applicants and the majority of 
- I\ 
nonwhite applicants meet the minimum requirements for loan approval (i.e. 8 > 8). The 
result is that the marginal credit score is on the upward sloping side of the distribution for 
both white and minority borrowers (Figure 2). Therefore, if underwriting errors occur in 
a random manner (and are symmetrical as Ferguson and Peters assume), the errors will 
result in a higher proportion of creditworthy applicants being denied mortgages than the 
proportion of uncreditworthy applicants that are approved. 16 If the distribution of 
minority borrowers is lower than the distribution of white borrowers (i.e., white 
borrowers have a higher distribution of credit quality), then minorities will be more 
adversely affected by the underwriting errors than white borrowers. 17 
Ferguson and Peters (1997) also argue that lenders may have a cultural affinity to 
white applicants. This cultural affinity refers to a higher level of efficiency in assessing 
the credit quality of white borrowers due to having more experience evaluating white 
borrowers in the past. Even if credit quality is homogeneous, if lenders make more 
underwriting errors on minority applicants than on white applicants the errors will have a 
16 The number of creditworthy minorities denied loans will be greater than the number of 
uncreditworthy minorities granted loans. Assuming p is the proportion of underwriting 
A 
e 





than the number of creditworthy minorities denied loans, f ph(8)d8. 
A 
e 
S+e e O+E e 
17 This is true because J ph(8)d8 - J ph(8)d8 > J pg(8)d8 - J pg(8)d8. 
A A A A 
e 0-E e 0-E 
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disparate impact on minority applicants (Figure 3). That is, minority applicants will have 
higher denial rates than white applicants due to the underwriting errors. 18 
Longhofer (1996) extends the cultural affinity hypothesis of Calomiris et. al. 
(1994). The Longhofer (1996) model assumes lenders accept applications from two 
groups, Wand M. The lenders are assumed to have a cultural affinity with group W. 
Lenders receive a signal, s1, of the borrower's true creditworthiness, e. The signal can be 
observed by outsiders. Due to their cultural affinity, lenders receive a second, private 
signal, s2, for group W. The second signal is a random signal, and is equally likely to 
contain information damaging to the loan applicant or information beneficial to the loan 
applicant. Using this model, Longhofer (1996) shows that the relative denial rates for 
group W and group M borrowers depends on whether the cutoff point, q*, is higher or 
lower than the average creditworthiness of the two groups. 19 If q* is above the average 
-
creditworthiness of the applicant pool, e , then group M applicants will have higher 
denial rates than group W applicants.2° Conversely, if q* is below the average, 
creditworthiness of the applicant pool, e , group W applicants will have higher denial 
18 This is true because the marginal cutoff point is on the upward sloping side.of the 
distribution. Assume PG is the proportion of underwriting errors on white applicants and 
PH is the proportion of underwriting errors on black applicants, (PH > PG). Black 
A A 
e+e e 
applicants will have higher denial rates than white applicants since f f(8)d8 > f f(8)d8. 
A A 
e e-e 
19 Here, Longhofer (1996) assumes that group Wand group M applicants have the same 
distribution of credit quality. 
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rates than group M applicants .. This result is obtained by evaluating the effect of the 
second signal, s2, on the loan outcome. If q* < 8, the critical cutoff point is on the 
upward sloping side of the distribution (Figure 4). Since the area under the curve to the 
right of q * is greater than the area under the curve to the left of q *, the second signal will 
result in more negative overrides of loan decisions than positive overrides. That is, group 
W borrowers will have more loans denied wheres,> q* than they will have loans 
approved where s1 < q*. · The second signal results in group W borrowers having higher 
denial rates than group M borrowers. 
The result shown above applies ifihe distribution of credit quality is the same for · 
white and minority applicants and if lender.s·act 011 additional negative information given 
in signal, s2, to the same degree that they act on additional positive information given in 
s2• If the distribution of credit quality is sufficiently higher for white borrowers than for 
minority borrowers, minorities will have higher denial rates than white borrowers. White 
borrowers will still have more negative overrides than positive overrides, but the lower 
credit quality. of minority applicants will result in minorities having higher denial rates. 
The additional assumption of a secondary market with standard loan underwriting 
guideiines results in a model of cultural affinity that is bothrealistic and consistent with 
empirical findings. Longhofer (1996) refers to the Fannie Mae guidelines that outline 
minimum standards of credit quality, but allow lend~rs to. use compensating factors to . 
approve loans that fall short of the minimum standards. Think of the minimum Fannie 
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information on white applicants than minority applicants, but will not collect additional 
information if the applicant already meets the minimum criteria. Even if the lender does 
collect negative information on an applicant, they may not use the information in 
underwriting the loan since the loan will be sold in the secondary market. Since the loan 
meets the objective minimum underwriting standards of Fannie Mae, the lender has no 
incentive to use the negative information.21 However, the lender will use any positive 
information as a compensating factor in the loan decision. Therefore, the additional 
information collected on white applicants due to the lender's cultural affinity for white 
applicants can only lead to positive overrides of the loan decision. In this framework, 
minorities will have higher denial rates. than white applicants even if the distribution of 
credit quality for the two groups is the same. If the distribution of credit quality for white 
applicants is higher than the distribution of credit quality for minority applicants, the 
higher denial rate for minority applicants is compounded even more. 
B. Two Basic Approaches to Empirical Research on Credit Discrimination 
Schill and Wachter (1993) divide credit discrimination research into two 
categories: aggregate investigations and accept/reject research. Aggregate research 
investigates the flow of mortgage activity into neighborhoods. These investigations use 
census data and some Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to determine if there 
21 Longhofer ( 1996) points out that the loan officer might not even make negative 
information about the applicant known to the loan committee if the loan already conforms 
to secondary market underwriting guidelines. To do so might jeopardize the loan and 
cost the loan officer a commission. 
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is evidence of redlining in certain areas. Aggregate research on discrimination requires 
· independent variables that measure (1) the demand for mortgage credit, (2) the risk of 
loss to the lender, and (3) the redlining variables (i.e., the proportion of minorities in the 
census tract). 
Accept/reject investigations use HMDA data, or more detailed data in some cases, 
to determine if there is evidence of lender discrimination against protected groups on a 
case by case basis. They employ independent variables to measure (1) the risk of loss to 
the lender and (2) the redlining variables. Credit decision(accept/rej~ct) investigations 
do not require measurement of the demand for mortgage credit. 
1. Investigations of Aggregate Discrimination · 
Prior to 1990, most published research on discrimmation in the home mortgage 
lending market were aggregate studies·ofredlining. Redlining occurs when lenders 
. . . 
refuse to make mortgage loans in certain geographic·areas. Most redlining research 
investigates the allocation of mortgage money across census tracts. The early 
investigations· of redlining foc1,1s on the supply of mortgage money across neighborhoods 
without considering the demand for mortgage loans. Canner and Smith (1991, 1992), 
. . . . 
. Canner, Passmore and Smith (1994) an:a Canner and Passinore(l 995) summarize lending 
patterns using HMDA data. They report thatinner-city areas and neighborhoods with a 
high proportion of blacks receive fewer and smaller loans than suburban areas.and 
neighborhoods with a high proportion of white residents. 
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Research that considers the demand for mortgage loans across census tracts 
indicates that much of the disparity in lending is explained by differences in the demand 
for mortgage credit.22 Leahy (1985) is one example of an investigation that considers the 
demand for residential mortgage loans. Leahy (1985) investigates the number and 
amount of conventional mortgage loans made by the 12 largest lenders in Summit 
County, Ohio in 1980 to determine if there is evidence of redlining. Leahy (1985) 
defines the amount of credit flowing into a neighborhood as a function of (1) the demand 
for loans and (2) selection among applicants for credit. Leahy (1985) uses six variables 
to measure the demand for conventional mortgage loans in a particular census tract: (1) 
total population in 1980, (2) the number of owner-occupied units in 1980, (3) the median 
age in 1980, (4) the percentage of the tract engaged in professional occupations in 1980, 
(5) the percentage change in the population from 1970 to 1980, and (6) the percentage 
change in owner-occupied units from 1970 to 1980. Five variables are used to measure· 
the selection among applicants for credit: (1) average number of persons per household 
in 1980, (2) median home value in 1980, (3) median family income in 1980, (4) 
percentage of female-headed households in 1980, and (5) percentage of housing units 
built before 1940. 
Leahy (1985) matches black census tracts with white census tracts that are 
"statistically equivalent" using the eleven empirical variables described earlier in a factor 
analysis. Leahy (1985) compares the number and amount of conventional mortgage 
22 Leahy (1985), Holmes and Horvitz (1994), and Holmes and James (1996) all find that 
differences in demand at least partially explain differences in lending patterns to low 
income and minority neighborhoods. 
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loans received by each black census tract to its "statistically equivalent" white census 
tract using an analysis of variance test. Leahy (1985) finds the black census tracts 
received only 37 percent of the amount of money loaned to the matching white census 
tracts. Leahy (1985) concludes that prejudice influenced the allocation of mortgage 
money in Akron, Ohio in 1980. However, Leahy (1985) failed to include any measures 
to account for home sales withinneighborhoods and the volume of home sales is believed 
to have a significant impact onthe demand for mortgage money. Avery (1989) stresses 
the importance of considering housing transfers in modeling the demand for residential 
mortgage loans. Even this might not be a good proxy forthe demand for mortgage loans 
because housing transfers would be endogenous to the decision by lenders to redline an 
area. Housing transfers only represent the demand for loans that has been satisfied. They 
do not reflect properties that could not be sold because mortgage money was not available 
to potential buyers. 
Holmes and Horvitz (1994) investigate the Houston, Texas mortgage market to 
determine if the racial composition of.census tracts affect mortgage lending activity. 
They use HMDA data for the years 1988 to 1991 and demographic data from the 1990 
census. Holmes and Horvitz (1994) include five general categories in theirmodel: (1) 
property and loan characteristics, (2) economic condition of the residents in the census 
tracts, (3) the risk ofloans made in e~ch census tract, (4) differences in the mobility of 
residents, and (5) racial characteristics of the census tracts. 
Variables used to proxy property and loan characteristics include ( 1) median 
home value, (2) the percentage of vacant homes in the census tract, and (3) the ratio of the 
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average loanto the average home value. The empirical variables used to proxy the 
economic condition of the residents in the census tract include (1) median household 
income, (2) percentage.of head of households between the ages of 25·and 34, (3) the 
percentage of adult residents with at least one year of education beyond high school, and 
(4) the percentage of owner-occupants with mortgage payment to gross income ratios 
exceeding 30 percent. The risk ofloans in the census tract is proxied by (1) the natural 
log of the ratio of the number of insured loans that defaulted during the period to the 
number of government-insured loans granted, and (2) the change in median home values 
from 1980 to 1990. Differences in the mobility ofresiden:ces are measured by (1) the 
percentage change in the number of owner occupants from 1980 to 1990, (2) the 
percentage· of residents who have moved into the census tract since 1985,' and (3) the 
percentage of single family homes that are rental units. The dependent variable in the 
regression is the number of loans made in the census tract expressed as a percentage of 
the number of owner-occupied homes in the census tract. 
Holmes and Horvitz (1994) find census tracts with a high proportion of minorities 
receive significantly fewer mortgages than census tracts with a high proportion of white 
residents. However, they conclude differences in mortgage lending across census tracts 
are justified based on differences in demand for mortgages and in the risk of lending 
across census tracts. They conclude there is no evidence of redlining in Houston over the 
period 1988 to 1991. Holmes and Horvitz (1994) point out their research only considers 
the existence or nonexistence of discrimination across census tracts. It is possible that a 
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disproportionate number of loans in census tracts with large minority populations are 
made to white borrowers. 
Holmes and James (1996) also investigate the Houston market. Holmes and 
J runes ( 1996) investigate the effect of the rcJ.cial composition of census tracts on the 
median home values in census tracts. They hypothesize that redlining minority 
neighborhoods would result in significantly lower median home values in the census 
tracts being redlined than could be explained by socioeconomic factors. Holmes and 
James (1996) use a generalized least squares regression model where the dependent 
variable is the median home value in 1990. The independent variables include (1) the 
percentage of total population that is black, {2) the percentage of total population that is 
Hispanic, (3) the change in the percentage of minorities in the census tract between 1980 
and 1990, ( 4) the median household income in 1990, ( 5) the percentage of the population 
between 25 and 34 years old, (6) the percentage of adult residents with some education 
beyond high school, (7) the percentage of single-family homes that are renter occupied, 
(8) the median age of the housing stock in the census tract, (9) the percentage of single-
family homes that are vacant, (10) the loan-to-value ratio, (11) the percentage of owner-
occupants with a mortgage payment to gross monthly income ratio greater than 30 
percent, (12) the percentage of current owner-occupants who moved in between 1985 and 
1990, (13) the percentage change in the number of owner-occupants between 1980 and 
1990, (14) the natural log of the default rate in insured mortgages, and (15) the percentage 
change in median home value. 
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The authors test for the combined effect of the three race-related variables. They 
find the race-related variables have a statistically significant impact, but dropping the 
race-related variables from the regression equation only reduces the R2 slightly, from 
.8010 to .7955. The authors conclude race-related variables do not significantly impact 
home values and lenders in Houston do not redline minority neighborhoods. 
Perle, Lynch and Homer (1993} argue that aggregate investigations of mortgage 
flows cannot identify redlining. They cite problems with four aspects of previous . . 
research that limits the usefulness of this type ofresearch: (1) structural modeling, (2) 
data availability, (3) aggrega{ion level, and(4) model specification. The problem with 
the structural modeling of previous redlining research stems from the necessity to model 
both the demand for and supply of mortgages in a neighborhood. A reduced form 
equation is generated where the dependent variable is· a measure of the number or amount 
of mortgage loans granted in a census tract The racial composition of the census tract is 
included in some form in the regression equation as an independent variable. Most 
redlining research interprets a significant coefficient on the race variable as evidence of 
redlining. These investigations assume any race effect is related to the supply side of the 
equation. Perle, Lynch and Homer (1993) state that at1 implicit assumption of redlining 
research is that there is no difference in the demand for mortgage loans across racial 
groups, holding other demand-related variables constant. For this condition to hold, it is 
a necessary condition that all economic and social variables correlated with race that 
affect mortgage demand be included in the reduced form equation. 
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This leads directly to the problem of data availability. Most aggregate research 
uses HMDA and census data. The data used in these investigations omit several variables 
that are correlated with race and important in the mortgage lending decision, such as 
credit history information and total obligations to income ratios. 
The aggregation level is also a problem with aggregate redlining investigations. If 
some lenders in a given market discriminate and others do not, Galster (1993) argues that 
minority applicants will eventually learn which lenders do not redline and will apply to 
those lenders for mortgage credit. The result is that redlining will not be found even 
though some lenders in the area discriminate. 
Perle, Lynch and Homer (1993) list three problems with model specification in 
aggregate investigations of redlining: (1) which functional form should be used, (2) 
which variables should be included in the model, and (3) the selection of a dependent 
variable. Perle, Lynch and Homer (1993) investigate the impact of different functional 
forms, independent variables, and dependent variables on the race coefficient with 1982 
mortgage data from the Detroit area and 1980 census data. They test a model where the 
quantity of mortgage loans is a function of (1) race, (2) socioeconomic characteristics, (3) 
neighborhood and housing characteristics, and ( 4) mobility. The percentage of black 
households is used as the race variable. The percentage of family households, the 
percentage of female-headed households, and the median household income are used to 
proxy socioeconomic characteristics. The neighborhood and housing characteristics are 
proxied by six variables: (1) percentage of the population aged 25 to 34, (2) percentage 
of houses built before 1939, (3) percentage of houses built between 1960 and 1980, (4) 
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the median value of owner-occupied housing units, ( 5) percentage of owner-occupied 
housing units, and (6) percentage of vacant housing units. Mobility is measured by the 
percentage of persons living in the same house since 1975. The dependent variable used 
in the analysis is the ratio of the number of conventional and governmental loans to the 
total number of housing units .. 
Perle, Lynch and Horner (1993}test the model using both stepwise and direct-
entry regression models. They also test the models using linear and log functions and test 
the eleven variable model against a sinipler four-variable model. The four variables in 
the simple model are (1) median household income, (2) percentage of vacant housing 
units, (3) percentage of owner-occupied housing units, and ( 4} percentage of black 
households. Their results indicate that the Jog function has slightly more explanatory 
power than the linear function and the eleven variable model has signtficantly more 
explanatory power than the simple four variable model. Stepwise regression did not 
provide any benefits over the direct-entry regressions. 
Perle, Lynch and Horner (1993) find a significant race coefficient with the simple 
model, regardless of the functional form of the model. They find the race variable to be 
. . 
insignificant in the full model using a log or linear function. · The race variable is 
significant using a multiplicative model, but with a positive sign. The authors conclude 
that existing aggregate investigations are unsuited for research on neighborhood redlining 
and encourage the accept/reject methodology for investigations into discrimination in 
residential mortgage lending. 
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Phillips-Patrick and Rossi (1996) propose a simultaneous equations approach to 
the investigation of redlining. They use 1990 census and 1992 HMDA data for the 
Washington, DC, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to compare the results of single 
equation models with the results from a simultaneous equations approach. They estimate 
two single equation models and one simultaneous equations model in their investigation. 
The first model includes median income, median home price, and the percentage of 
residents in the census tract that are black. The coefficient on the race variable in this 
model is significant at the . 01 level. Phillips-Patrick and Rossi ( 1996) point out that, 
without further investigation, the conclusion would be that redlining exists in 
Washington, DC. However, the first model omits several census tract variables that 
· might explain lending discrepancies across census tracts. 
The second model has ten independent variables: (1) percentage of black 
residents in the census tract, (2) median income, (3) median loan-to-value ratio, (4) 
census tract vacancy rate, ( 5) median age of residents, ( 6) unemployment rate, (7) 
percentage of properties that are rental units, (8) percentage of boarded-up housing, (9) 
percentage of in-migration in the census tract from 1989 to 1990, and (10) loan amount. 
The coefficient on the race variable in this model is not statistically significant. 
Conclusions from this model would be that redlining does not exist in Washington, DC. 
The third model estimates a simultaneous equations model. The·demand equation 
includes all the variables from the second model except median loan-to-value ratio and 
loan amount. The demand equation also includes median home price. The supply side 
equation includes all of the variables from the second model except the percentage of 
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rental units, the percentage of in-migration from 1989 to 1990, and the median age. The 
supply side equation also includes the median home price. The demand for loans is 
measured as the ratio of mortgage applications to total salable units and supply of loans is 
measured as the ratio of total originations to total salable units. The authors find that loan 
originations drop in neighborhoods as the percentage of black residents increases. They 
conclude this could be the result of redlining or it could be the. result of an omitted 
variable problem. Phillips-Patrick and Rossi ( 1996) point to the different findings of the 
three models as evidence that redlining investigations using aggregate loan data are 
inconclusive and can be misleading. 
2. Investigations of Discrimination in Individual Loan Decisions 
Accept/reject investigations have several advantages over aggregate research. 
First, they don't require estimates of the demand for mortgage loans. Second, they are a 
more direct test of discrimination in the mortgage markets. Third, the lender(s) involved 
in discriminatory lending practices may be identified using accept/reject investigations. 
Avery, Beeson and Sniderman (1992) use 1990HMDA data to investigate 
variations in minority loan originations across lenders. The authors attempt to determine 
if differences in minority loan originations are primarily due to differences in minority 
application rates or differences in minority approval rates. The final sample consists of 
1,984,688 applications from 8,745 institutions operating in 40,008 census tracts in all 340 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA's). The authors estimate a linear regression equation 
where the dependent variable is the ratio of minority approvals to total approvals for the 
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lending institution, and the independent variables are the ratio of minority applications to 
total applications and the ratio of minority approval rates to total approval rates. 
Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1992) find the variance across lenders in minority 
and low-income loan originations is accounted for primarily by the variance in 
application rates as opposed to differences in the disposition of the applications. For the 
U.S. as a whole, 87 to 91 percent of lender-specific differences in credits to minorities 
were accounted for by differences in minority application rates. These results held for all 
types of institutions, for different lender sizes,. for different lender market shares, and for 
various definitions of the relevant market. 
Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman (1992) also investigate the differences in minority 
and nonminority denial rates. They employ a linear probability model with the following 
independent variables: (1) income, (2) a dummy variable for the gender of the applicant, 
(3) a dummy variable-to indicate if the loan application is for a government-insured loan, 
(4) loan amount, (5) a dummy variable to indicate.the MSA, (6) a dummy variable to 
indicate the census tract, and (7) a dummy variable to indicate the lender. Avery, Beeson, 
and Sniderman (1992)find denial rates for minority loan applications cannot be explained 
by the applicants' economic characteristics. Minorities have a 25 .2 percent denial rate 
while nonminorities have a 13 .1 percent denial rate. The authors conclude the 
unexplained differences in denial rates may result from lender bias or from differences in 
the unobserved characteristics of the loan application. The analysis excludes variables 
such as credit and employment histories, loan-to-value ratios and total obligations-to-
income ratios which are believed to influence the loan decision. 
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A second analysis by Avery, Beeson and Sniderman (1993b) uses 1990 HMDA 
data to investigate racial differences in lending. The investigation addresses the 
possibility that differences in minority loan approval rates can be explained by applicant 
characteristics other than race or property location. The linear probability model 
employed estimates the probability that a random loan application will be denied based 
on applicant characteristics, race, MSA, census tract, and lender. The investigation 
includes loans for the purpose of home purchase, refinance, and home improvement. The 
investigation reveals denial rates for minority applicants are consistently higher than 
those for white applicants with otherwise identical attributes as reported in the HMDA 
data. The conclusions are consistent across geographic markets and loan products. The 
evidence suggests racial differences in denial _rates are widespread and cannot be 
attributed to particular areas or certain types of lenders. 
Schill and Wachter {1993) investigate discrimination in mortgage lending using 
1992 HMDA and 1990 census data for Boston and Philadelphia. The authors specify a 
logit regression model where the probability that a loan is approved is a function of 
individual loan characteristics and census tract characteristics. Applications for home 
purchase, home improvement, and refinancing are tested separately. 
The dependent variable in the logit regression equation equals one if the loan was 
approved and zero if it was rejected. Schill and Wachter (1993) specify two models. The 
first model has ten independent variables derived from the HMDA data. These variables 
measure individual loan characteristics. One of the independent variables is the percent 
of households in the census tract headed by a person who is black. The second model 
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includes the ten independent variables from the first model and adds seven more 
independent variables from census data to measure census tract characteristics. 
Schill and Wachter (1993) find the racial composition of the census tract is 
statistically significant in the first model and not statistically significant in the second 
model. The results hold in Boston and Philadelphia for all loan products except 
applications for mortgage refinancing in Boston. In this case, the race coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant at the .05 level, indicating black applicants were less 
likely to have applications for mortgage refinancing approved in Boston than identically 
qualified white applicants. Schill and Wachter ( 1993) conclude the weight of the 
evidence is inconsistent with theories of redlining against minority neighborhoods. The 
authors find neighborhood risk factors, such as percent of owner-occupied homes, percent 
of vacant housing units, and median household income help explain differences in 
mortgage flows across neighborhoods: 
Schill and Wachter (1993) emphasize the need for a more complete dataset to 
come to any definitive conclusions about redlining. The authors also emphasize further 
research is needed to determine the sources of any racial or ethnic geographic disparities 
in mortgage lending. 
A recent investigation by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston employs the most 
comprehensive loan application information of any of the recent credit decision 
investigations (Munnell, Tootell, Browne, and McEneaney (1996)).23 The sample is 
23This investigation was conducted and first released in 1992 as Boston Federal Reserve 
Working Paper No. 92-7. 
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taken from the 1990 HMDA disclosures of financial institutions in the Boston MSA. The 
sample of applications exhibits denial rates for white applicants of 10 .3 percent and 
denial rates for black/Hispanic applicants of28.l percent. The data set is expanded to 
include 38 additional variables that might influence the loan decision (e.g., net wealth, 
loan-to-value ratios and total debt payments to income ratios).24 
Munnell et. al. (1996) assume mortgage lenders maximize profits by minimizing 
the probability and costs of default associated with each mortgage loan. The probability 
of a lender denying a mortgage application is hypothesized to be a function of ( 1) the 
applicant's ability to meet loan payments, (2) the risks of default, (3) the potential loss 
associated with default and foreclosure, and (4).the terms of the loan. The model also 
considers personal characteristics, such as race. The ability of the applicant to meet loan 
payments is measured ·by obligation ratios and net wealth. The risk ofdefault is 
measured by credit histories; public record histories of credit problems, and employment 
characteristics. The potential loss associated with default is measured by the loan-to-
value ratio, a dummy variable for denial of private mortgage insurance, and a dummy 
variable indicating if the loan will be secured by a two-to-four family dwelling. These 
variables are included in a logit regression equation with a dummy variable for the race of 
the applicant. The dependent variable is the probability that the mortgage loan 
application will be denied; Munnell et. al. (1996) run several models using different 
24 The authors indicate they had extensive conversations with lenders, underwriters, and 
examiners and the 38 additional variables collected include any variables considered to be 
important by these groups. 
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empirical variables to find the model with the best "fit." The race coefficient is highly 
significant in every model specification tested. 
Munnell et. al. (1996) find minority applicants have greater debt burdens, higher 
loan-to-value ratios, weaker credit histories, and are less likely to purchase a single-
family home than white applicants. These factors account for a large portion, but not all, 
, 
of the disparity between minority and white denials. Black and Hispanic applicants are 
rejected 60 percent more often than white applicants when financial, employment, and 
neighborhood characteristics are held constant. Munnell et. al. (1996) also find denied 
black/Hispanic applicants on average have poorer objective qualifications than denied 
white applicants. Denied minorities have lower income and wealth, higher obligation and 
loan-to-value ratios, and worse .credit histories than denied whites. The authors conclude 
Boston area lenders discriminated against minorities, particularly black applicants, in the 
market for home mortgages in 1990. · 
The Munnell et. al. (1996) investigation has been criticized for errors in data 
coding, poor model specification, and questionable interpretation of the statistics by the 
authors. Data coding errors are pointed out by Home (1994), Liebowitz (1993), and Carr 
and Megbolugbe (1993). Home (1994) with FDIC staff, examined the loan files of 
FDIC-supervised institutions included in Munnell et. al. (1996). The FDIC staff 
reviewed all loans that appeared to be discriminatory. They find no evidence of 
discrimination, but they do find numerous cases where data had been miscoded by the 
financial institutions participating in the sample or by the authors. Liebowitz (1993) 
claims that omitting the observations with inconsistent data or extreme observations 
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results in an insignificant race coefficient. Carr and Megbolugbe (1993) conduct a 
procedure to identify errors and "clean" the Boston Fed dataset. They find the data errors 
are not responsible for the significant race effect in Munnell et. al. (1996). Their findings 
with the clean data are very similar to the findings reported in Munnell et. al. (1996). 
Zandi (1993) criticizes Munnell et. al. (1996) for improper model specification. 
Zandi (1993) claims Munnell et. al. (1996) suffers from omitted-variable bias. He finds 
the impact of race is greatly reduced if four variables are added to the Boston Fed model. 
The variables Zandi includes are (1) a dummy variable which indicates if the loan meets 
loan underwriting guidelines, (2) a dummy variable to indicate if some information was 
unverifiable, (3) a dummy variable indicating if there is a cosigner, and (4) the loan 
amount.25 
Tootell (1996) uses data collected by the Boston Federal Reserve in 1992 to 
investigate the Boston area market for evidence ofredlining.26 The focus of the 
investigation is to distinguish redlining neighborhoods from the effects of racial 
discrimination against individual applicants. Munnell et. al. (1996) find evidence of 
discrimination against black borrowers using the Boston Fed dataset. Tootell (1996) 
investigates the importance of the racial composition of the neighborhood in the lending 
25 Browne and Tootell (1995) state the Munnell et. al. (1996) research did include the 
loan amount and a dummy variable indicating the existence of a cosigner ,and neither 
variable was significant. Browne and Tootell (1995) argue against including verification 
and credit standards questions because both "involve an ex post judgment by the 
respondent." The other variables in Munnell et. al. (1996) are based on objective criteria. 
26 Tootell (1996) uses the same dataset used in Munnell et. al. (1996). For a more 
complete description of the dataset and how it was originated, refer to the discussion of 
Munnell et. al. (1996). 
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decision after controlling for the race of the applicant. Tootell (1996) argues the Boston 
area market is ideally suited for this type of analysis because over 50 percent of the 
minority applications received by Boston area lenders in 1992 were for properties located 
in predominately white census tracts. 
Tootell (1996) estimates a logit regression model and a linear probability model 
where the dependent variable·equals one if the loan application is denied and zero 
otherwise. First, Tootell (1996) estimates a model using the variables used in Munnell et. 
al. (1996), except for the tract characteristic variables. The only tract characteristic 
variables Tootell ( 1996) includes are variables to measure the racial characteristics of the 
census tract. Two variable specifications are used. The first specification uses a dummy 
variable to indicate if the minority population in the census tract exceeds 30 percent. The 
second variable specification is the percentage of minority residents in the census tract. 
When the race ofthe·applicant is excluded from.the models, the variables 
measuring the racial composition of census tracts are highly significant. When the race 
of the applicant is included in the models, the race variable is highly significant and the 
variables measuring the racial composition of the census tract are no longer significant. 
Tootell (1996) concludes the racial composition of the census tract does not 
significantly affect the mortgage lending decision, but the race of the applicant does. The 
evidence suggests racial discrimination against individual loan applicants, not redlining 
of minority neighborhoods. 
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Becker ( 1993) criticizes investigations of racial discrimination in mortgage 
lending such as Munnell et. al. (1996) for calculating denial rates instead oflooking at the 
profitability of loans to different groups. Becker (1993) and England (1993) argue that, if 
discrimination exists, minorities should have lower default rates than nonminorities. 
They contend that failing to observe lower default rates for minority borrowers is 
evidence against racial discrimination in mortgage lending. Brimelow and Spencer 
(1993) also use this reasoning to challenge the findings of Munnell et. al. (1996). They 
cite the Boston Fed's finding that the average mortgage default rate for minority 
neighborhoods in Boston is the same as the rate for white neighborhoods. Brimelow and 
Spencer (1993) argue equal default rates for minority and white neighborhoods 
contradicts the Munnell et. al. (1996) conclusion that Boston area lenders discriminate 
against minority applicants. 
Munnell et. al. (1996), Tootell (1993), Browne and Tootell (1995), Galster 
(1993), and Ferguson and Peters (1995) argue that racial discrimination in the mortgage 
market will result in lower default rates for minority borrowers only if certain conditions 
hold. Tootell (1993) and Browne and Tootell (1995) argue equal minority and white 
default rates can only be used as evidence of nondiscrimination if the distribution of the 
quality of accepted minority applicants is identical to the distribution of accepted white 
applicants in a nondiscriminatory lending framework. 27 Galster ( 1993) argues 
271n a nondiscriminatory lending framework where the quality of black and white 
applicants are identically distributed, default rates would be equal for the two groups. 
Any discriminatory behavior that involved holding minorities to a higher standard than 
white borrowers would result in lower default rates for black borrowers. This assumption 
is critical for the arguments of Becker (1993) and England ( 1993) to be valid. 
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inequalities between whites and minorities in occupations, income, indebtedness, and 
assets will result in minority mortgage holders being distributed more heavily in higher 
default risk categories. He argues minority borrowers will have higher default rates than 
white borrowers in a nondiscriminatory lending environment. 
LaCour-Little (1996) uses reverse regression on the data from Munnell et. al. 
(1996) to test for discrimination. First, the author estimates a logit regression equation 
with eleven independent variables used in Munnell et. al. (1996). The dependent 
variable, ACTION, equals one if the loan was denied. There is no race coefficient in this 
model. Predicted probabilities of loan denial are estimated for each observation. The 
predicted probabilities are considered the inverse qualifications index, Q-INDEX. Each 
loan has a Q-INDEX, an estimated probability ofloan denial. The Q-INDEX values are 
then used as the dependent variable in an ordinary least squares regression. · The 
independent variables in this regression are the action taken by the lender, ACTION, and 
the race of the applicant, RACE. The purpose of this procedure is to determine, on 
average, whether minority applicants are more or less qualified than white applicants 
given that the loan was approved. A value, a*, is calculated by taking the negative of the 
RACE coefficient and dividing by the ACTION coefficient. This value, a*, is a measure 
of the average qualifications of accepted minority applicants relative to accepted white 
applicants. The value of a* in the reverse regression procedure is -.193. LaCour-Little 
(1996) interprets this value to indicate that accepted minority applicants had average 
qualifications 19 percent lower than accepted white applicants. LaCour-Little (1996) 
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concludes that lenders hold white applicants to higher standards than minority applicants 
and argues this is evidence of reverse discrimination. 
The fact that approved minority applicants have average qualifications 19 percent 
lower than approved white applicants is not necessarily proof of reverse discrimination as 
LaCour-Little (1996) contends. The findings simply substantiate what many researchers 
have argued. The distribution of the quality of accepted minority applicants is lower than 
the distribution of the quality of white applicants. If the model developed by Ferguson 
and Peters (1995) holds, and empirical evidence in Munnell et. al. (1996).indicates that it 
probably does, then the finding by LaCour-Little (1996) is to be expected. The findings 
of LaCour-Little ( 1996) actually provide further evidence that the distribution of the 
quality of accepted minority applicants is lower than the distribution of accepted white 
applicants. 
Hunter and Walker (1995) ,empirically test the, cultural affinity hypothesis of 
Calomiris et. al. (1994). According to Hunter and Walker (1995), if the cultural affinity 
hypothesis is true, lenders will rely more heavily on objective measures of credit quality 
when evaluating minority loan applicants. Therefore, minority applicants' probability of 
loan approval should be more sensitive than white.applicants' probability of loan 
approval to changes in these objective measures. 
The authors use a subset of the Boston Federal Reserve loan application data used 
in Munnell et. al. (1996). The dataset consists of 1,991 loan applications taken by Boston 
area lenders in 1990. The dataset includes 1,726 approved loan applications and 265 
denied loan applications. There are 1,516 white applicants and 475 black and Hispanic 
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applicants in-the dataset. The actual loan approval rate for white applicants in the dataset 
is 90 percent compared to 76 percent for black and Hispanic applicants. 
Hunter and Walker (1995) estimate a logit regression model that includes 26 
independent variables. The independent variables are similar to those used in the 
Munnell et. al. (1996) investigation, but also include dummy variables to measure (1) 
education level, (2) whether or not there is a co-signer on the loan, (3) the thickness of the 
loan file (the file is considered thick if there are two or more credit reports in the file), and 
( 4) the sex of the applicant. 
The authors isolate the affects of each independent variable on the probability of 
loan approval by holding all the independent variables constant except one and examining 
the effect of changes in the independent variable on the probability of loan approval. The 
impact of changes in one independent variable on the probability of loan approval is 
determined for high quality borrowers and for marginal borrowers by manipulating the 
values of the remaining independent variables. 28 
Hunter and Walker(1995) find that race is unimportant for high quality 
applicants. For marginal applicants, credit history problems and high obligations-to-
income ratios are more detrimental if the borrower is a minority. Holding other factors 
constant, marginal white applicants with a total obligations-to-income ratio of .3 have a 
94 percent probability of loan approval rate while marginal black applicants with 
identical objective characteristics have an 88 percent probability of loan approval. If the 
28 For high quality applicants, the independent variables are held constant at values that 
are consistent with good credit quality. For marginal applicants, the independent 
variables are held constant at values that reflect significantly greater credit risk. 
48 
same marginal white and minority applicants have a total obligations-to-income ratio of 
.6, the probability of loan approval for the white applicant is 70 percent compared to just 
16 percent for the minority applicant. 
Based on their findings, Hunter and Walker (1995) conclude that lenders do rely 
more heavily on objective criteria when evaluating minority loan applicants. This is 
consistent with the cultural affinity hypothesis of Calomiris et. al. (1994). 
3. Current State of the Research on Discrimination in Residential 
Mortgage Lending 
There is consistent evidence that minorities are two to three times more likely to 
be denied residential mortgage loans than nonminorities. There is also consistent 
evidence that predominantly black census tracts receive fewer residential mortgage loans 
than predominantly white census tracts. The current debate focuses on the reason for 
these racial disparities. Are these disparities the result of lenders having a taste for 
discrimination? Are they the result of owner wealth maximizing behavior by lenders? 
Do lenders practice statistical discrimination by using race as an inexpensive proxy to 
measure credit risk? Finally, do lenders have a cultural affinity with white applicants that 
makes them more likely to consider factors other than the objective criteria normally 
used? 
Empirical investigations of aggregate research (i.e., redlining) and accept/reject 
investigations have come a long way and answered some important questions. For 
example, well constructed investigations of redlining have consistently failed to find 
evidence that lenders redline low income neighborhoods. However, there are still many 
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unanswered questions, including whether or not lenders discriminate against minorities in 
individual credit decisions and which variables should be included as proxies for credit 
risk in accept/reject investigations. 
The variables used in the accept/reject research must accurately reflect the default 
risk of the borrower. Two types of errors are possible that will lead to incorrect 
conclusions about whether or not discrimination occurs. First, variables that influence 
default risk and are highly correlated with race may be omitted from the credit decision 
model. Several previous investigations have suffered from this omitted variable bias. In 
these investigations, a finding of discrimination may result from omitting an important 
variable from the model. 
Second, the model could include economic variables highly correlated with race 
that do not accurately reflect default risk. Including these variables in the credit decision 
model should lead to a finding of no discrimination,·. ·However, if the credit decision 
model includes variables that do not accurately reflect default risk and the variable results 
in higher denial rates for minorities, discriminatory lending may be present and not 
identified. 
The methodology employed in this research incorporates the borrower's loan 
default decision into the credit decision. This analysis is crucial to assure that only 
variables affecting default risk are included in the credit decision model. 
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CHAPTER III. 
THE EVIDENCE ON LOAN DEF AULT MODELS 
The nature of the credit decision process is central to a discussion of racial 
disparities in mortgage lending. The credit decision focuses on the probability of default 
by the borrower and the cost to the lender in the event a default occurs. The nature of the 
credit decision process could produce racial disparities if economic variables correlated 
with race that do not accurately reflect default risk are included in the credit decision. 
The determinants of default risk have received extensive analysis. Quercia and Stegman 
(1992) divide the research on residential mortgage defaults into three categories, which 
they refer to as first, second, and third generation research. 
A. First Generation Research 
This line of research views default from the lender's perspective. These 
investigations attempt to identify loan, borrower, and property characteristics at the time 
of loan origination that contribute to loan default. These investigations do not tend to be 
based on well-developed theoretical models. They simply focus on identifying the 
determinants of residential mortgage defaults. 
One of the earliest investigations into the determinants of residential mortgage 
defaults is von Furstenberg (1969). Using FHA origination data for 1957 through 1965 
and default data on the same loans from 1962 through 1966, von Furstenberg (1969) 
investigates the effect of financing terms on default probabilities. The research involves 
estimating a multiple regression equation where the dependent variable is the ratio of 
defaulted loans to total FHA endorsed loans for each year. The independent variables are 
51 
the equity ratio (measured as one minus the loan-to-value ratio), the duration of the 
mortgage, and the duration of the mortgage squared: 
D, = b0 + b1(1 - LN) + bi(t) + bit2). 
The equation is estimated separately for original maturities of 20, 25, and 30 years and 
for new and existing homes. A new home is defined as a home not previously owner 
occupied. 
Regression results indicate the equity ratio is negative and significant at the .01 
level in each of the six regression calculations. The duration of the mortgage is positive 
and significant at the .01 level in five of the six calculations, while the duration squared is 
negative and significant at the .01 level in five of the six calculations. The duration and 
duration squared are not statistically significant for loans with original maturities of 20 
years secured by new homes. 
These findings indicate equity reduces default risk and:default risk increases as 
the age of the mortgage increases, but at a decreasing rate. · The importance of home 
equity is highlighted by von Furstenberg (1969). Using a 90 percent loan-to-value ratio 
as the base case, von Furstenberg (1969) shows that as the loan-to-value ratio increases 
from 90 percent to 97 percent, default rates quintuple. Loans with loan-to-value ratios of 
76-80 percent result in default rates at one-third the level of loans with 90 percent loan-
to-value ratios. 
These findings lead von Furstenberg (1969) to the conclusion that home equity is 
the dominant factor affecting default rates. He also finds higher default rates on loans 
with longer original terms to maturity. 
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Herzog and Earley (1970) investigate the influence of loan characteristics, 
borrower-related factors, and economic factors on loan delinquencies and default. The 
authors use 12,581 FHA and VA loans originated in 1963 to estimate separate regression 
models for loan delinquencies and loan defaults. 
Loan characteristics in the model include the loan-to-value ratio, a dummy 
variable to indicate the existence of a second mortgage on the property, and the term to 
maturity. Borrower-related factors in the model are the number of dependents, marital 
status, payment-to-income ratio, and dummy variables to measure (1) if the borrower is 
employed in a professional occupation and (2) if the borrower is self-employed. A 
dummy variable for the region of the country is used to proxy economic conditions. 
Herzog and Earley (1970) conclude that the existence of a second mortgage is the 
most important factor in explaining default. Defaults are positively related to the 
existence of junior financing. The existence of a second mortgage increases the loan-to-
value ratio for the borrower, and reduces the equity the borrower has in the home. 
Therefore, this relationship is not surprising. Results of the analysis also indicate loans 
with higher loan-to-value ratios and self-employed borrowers are more likely to default, 
while borrowers employed in a professional occupation are less likely to default. 
Contrary to the findings ofvon Furstenberg (1969), Herzog and Earley (1970) do not find 
the term to maturity to be a significant factor in explaining loan delinquency or default. 
The payment-to-income ratio, marital status, and number of dependents are also 
statistically insignificant in the Herzog and Earley (1970) investigation. 
Vandell (1978) develops a general model of default risk where the factors 
affecting default risk are "borrower related effects, the payment burden over time, the 
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equity accumulation over time, and a transient time term." Vandell (1978) uses borrower 
income, Y, at time t to proxy borrower-related effects. He hypothesizes that income will 
be negatively related to default risk and will be more important in lower income ranges. 
The payment burden is measured as the payment-to-income ratio, Q/Y. Default risk is 
expected to increase at an increasing rate as the payment -to-income ratio increases. The 
equity accumulation over time is measured as the contemporaneous equity-to-value ratio, 
E/Y, where equity includes the downpayment, amortization of the mortgage, and equity 
obtained through property appreciation. The equity ratio is hypothesized to be negatively 
related to default risk and changes in equity are expect to influence default risk more at 
low equity levels than at high equity levels. Vandell (1978) estimates a log-linear model 
of default risk where: 
Using the model developed1by von Furstenberg (1969) and transforming variables to fit 
his model using simulations, Vandell (1978) fits the simulated data to his regression 
equation.29 Vandell (1978) finds the contemporaneous equity ratio isthe dominant factor 
in explaining loan defaults. The payment-to-income ratio and income variables are not 
statistically significant. . , . 
The dominant finding of first generation research into residential loan defaults is 
that home equity plays a central role in explaining loan defaults. There is little evidence 
29 The Vandell (1978) model includes some variables not included in the von Furstenberg 
(1969) model and includes other variables that can change over time. Vandell (1978) 
makes several assumptions to calculate these variables in the simulations (i.e., constant 
income and property values, property values are related to income only). 
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that borrower characteristics such as employment history and payment burdens are 
important factors. 
B. Second Generation Research 
The second generation research views default from the borrower's perspective. 
This line of research is based on the economic theory of consumer behavior (Quercia and 
Stegman (1992)). These investigations model the decision by the borrower to default or 
continue paying as a decision made by borrowers to maximize their utility over time. In 
this sense, utility maximization is generally meant to imply wealth maximization.30 
Jackson and Kaserman (1980) formally develop two competing theories to explain 
residential mortgage defaults. They refer to these theories as (1) the equity theory of 
default and (2) the ability to pay theory of default. The purpose of the investigation is. to. 
derive testable hypotheses to determine if the empirical evidence supports one theory 
over the other. 
The equity model developed by Jackson and Kaserman (1980) assumes borrowers 
will default if this course of action results in the best financial outcome for the borrower. 
The model assumes borrowers will default if the market value of the mortgaged property 
falls below the outstanding balance on the loan. The probability of default is equal to the 
probability that the market value of the property falls below the loan balance. Jackson 
and Kaserman (1980) use comparative statics to determine the expected influence of the 
30 Although utility maximization would include other factors, such as pride in 
homeownership, these factors are not included in investigations of the determinants of 
default because they are virtually impossible to measure. 
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loan-to-value ratio, term to maturity, and contract interest rate on the probability of 
default. According to the equity theory of default developed by Jackson and Kaserman 
(1980), all three variables should be positively related to the probability of default. 
The ability to pay model of default assumes borrowers will continue to make 
required mortgage payments as long as their current income, net of expenditures that are 
deemed more important than the mortgage payment, is sufficient to do so. The 
probability of default is equal to the probability that the income available to make the 
mortgage payment is less than the required payment. Jackson and Kaserman (1980) 
conduct comparative statics analysis on the ability to pay model to determine the 
expected influence of the loan-to-value ratio, term to maturity, and contract interest rate 
on the probability of default. The only sign that is different for the two models is the 
term to maturity. 
The equity theory of default indicates longer maturities should increase the 
probability of default. This is reasonable because a longer term to maturity results in 
slower equity accumulation, making it more likely the market value of the property will 
fall below the outstanding balance on the loan. The ability to pay theory of default 
indicates a longer term to maturity should decrease the probability of default. Longer 
terms to maturity reduce the required payment on the mortgage, making it less likely that 
the income available to pay the mortgage will fall below the required mortgage payment. 
Jackson and Kaserman (1980) use this difference to test which model the data 
supports. Jackson and Kaserman (1980) estimate regression equations using the loan-to-
value ratio, term to maturity, and contract interest rate on the loan with data on 1,736 
FHA loans originated in 1969. Results of the empirical tests indicate all three empirical 
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variables are positively related to loan default. Only the loan-to-value ratio is significant 
at the .05 level. Even though the term to maturity is only marginally significant (at the 
.10 level), Jackson and Kaserman (1980) conclude the empirical evidence supports the 
equity theory of default over the ability to pay theory of default. 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) develop a single period model of the default 
decision where borrowers are assumed to choose the qualitative choice, S, that maximizes 
their utility. In the Campbell and Dietrich (1983) model, the borrower has four choices: 
(1) default, (2) become delinquent, (3) prepay the mortgage, and (4) continue payment. 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) hypothesize the borrower's current equity position 
(measured as the contemporaneous loan-to.;value ratio) and the currentpayment to 
obligations ratio are the principal determinants in the borrower's default decision. This is 
similar to the development by Jackson and Kaserman (1980) of an equity model of 
default and an ability to pay model of default. However, Campbell and Dietrich (1983) 
recognize these two factors may work together to cause default. They argue increasing 
payment-to- income ratios that make borrowers unable to make their mortgage payments 
will only lead to default if that is the lowest cost solution. If the borrower has significant 
equity in the property, default is unlikely regardless of the payment to income ratio. 
Campbell and Dietrich (1983) argue the probability of default should be positively related 
to the payment to income ratio and the loan-to-value ratio. They also argue the 
probability of default should be negatively related to the relative spread between the 
current mortgage rate and the original mortgage rate. A positive spread makes default 
less likely because borrowers may be able to allow potential homebuyers to assume their 
loan, effectively increasing the marketability of their residence. Campbell and Dietrich 
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(1983) also include { 1) the regional unemployment rate, (2) a dummy variable to indicate 
if the house is new, and (3) the age of the mortgage (and age squared) in their empirical 
model. The regional unemployment rate is expected to be positively related to the 
probability of default. Campbell and Dietrich (1983) hypothesize the probability of 
default will be higher for new homes than older homes because they believe buyers of 
new homes tend to be younger and more transient and might be more likely to experience 
personal and financial problems than most borrowers. The age of the mortgage is 
expected to have a nonlinear relationship with .the probability of default. Campbell and 
Dietrich (1983) utilize a multinomial logit regression equation where the probability of 
default is the dependent variable. 
The data used in the Campbell and Dietrich (1983) research consists of 
approximately 2.5 million conventional residential mortgage loans originated and insured 
bythe Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC)between 1960 and 1980. The 
MGIC maintains a continuous record of each loan until insurance is canceled or the 
mortgage defaults. The investigation also uses regional economic data. The economic 
data used includes indices of mean housing prices and nominal disposable income, the 
unemployment rate and the current mortgage rate in the region. The data is aggregated 
each year based on (1) the state where the mortgage was originated (50 states and the 
District of Columbia), (2) the age of the dwelling (old or new), and (3) the original loan-
to-value ratio (four categories).31 The number of observations in the sample is reduced to 
4,899 by eliminating observations with less than 50 individual loans. 
31 For each year, observations are placed in one of 408 groups (51 states times 2 age 
classifications x 4 loan-to-value ratio categories. 
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Campbell and Dietrich (1983) run regressions with and without the age of the 
mortgage and the age of the mortgage squared as independent variables. The current 
payment to income ratio is positive and significant in the regression that includes the age 
variables, but is negative and insignificant when the age variables are excluded. The 
current loan to value ratio, the unemployment rate, and the dummy variable indicating a 
new residence are positive and significant in both default model specifications. The ratio 
of the current mortgage rate to the contract rate is negative and significant for both model 
specifications. Campbell and Dietrich (1983) conclude the current loan-to-value ratio 
significantly influences the default decision and that unemployment rates had a 
significant impact on the probability of default in the 1960's and 1970's. 
Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) also model the default decision using a model of 
borrower choice. The model assumes that borrowers make decisions to maximize their 
wealth in the terminal period. Their model is based on the Campbell and Dietrich (1983) 
model. In the Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) model, the borrower has five choices: (1) 
default, (2) become delinquent, (3) prepay through refinancing, (4) prepay through resale, 
and (5) continue payments. Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) express the payoff function if 
the borrower defaults as: 
where, 
WO = (Y - R - Qr)(l + r) + W(l + r) 
WO = expected terminal real after-tax wealth if the borrower defaults, 
Y = real annual after-tax household income, 
R = required real nondiscretionary expenditures ( other than housing), 
Qr = required real rent on new unit, 
ri = expected real return on nonhousing investments, 
W = current real nonhousing wealth. 
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The payoff function if borrowers continue payments is: 
where, 
We= expected terminal real after-tax wealth if the borrower continues 
making payments, 
Q = required real after-tax payment on mortgage (plus taxes, insurance 
and other ownership costs), 
rb = expected opportunity cost of borrowing, 
ri = expected real return on nonhousing investment, 
r0 = ri, if Y - R- Q >= 0, or r0 = rb, ifY - R - Q < 0), 
VT = expected real market value of current home, 
LT = expected real outstanding .loan balance on current mortgage. 
Based on the model, borrowers will choose to default if the expected terminal real after-
tax wealth from defaulting on the mortgage ,is greater than the expected terminal real 
after-tax wealth from continuing to make payments (WO > W c). Assume real income 
exceeds real expenditures (Y - R - .Q > 0). The excess of real income is assumed to be 
.invested.in nonhousing investments where it will earn the expected real return on 
nonhousing investment,.ri .. The borrower will default if the equity in the home is 
expected to be less than the savings from renting plus interest: 
One major contribution of the Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) model is the 
recognition that the rental costs of a new unit must be considered. If a comparable unit 
can be rented for much less that the required mortgage payment (Q is much greater than 
Qr), then default is more likely. The impact of the required rental payment on the 
probability of default is modeled formally for the first time by Vandell and Thibodeau 
(1985). 
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Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) use 28 empirical variables to estimate their model. 
The empirical variables include three loan-related variables, three financial market 
variables, 16 borrower-related variables, and six variables proxying housing market and 
economic conditions.32 Vandell and Thibodeau use historical data on 348 conventional, 
owner-occupied loans originated from 1972 to 1983 in the Dallas, Texas area. The model 
is tested using a logit regression model with 2073 observations, one observation for each 
year each loan was outstanding. The dependent variable in the analysis is whether or not 
the borrower defaulted on the loan. 
Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) find nonequity factors play an important role in the 
borrower's decision to default. They find several borrower characteristics influence 
default. Self-employed borrowers and borrowers working on a commission basis are 
found to be more likely to default than borrowers with salary income. · The length of 
employment is negatively related to default. Wealth levels are also found to be 
negatively related to default. These findings are consistent with the theoretical model 
developed in Vandell and Thibodeau (1985). The authors conclude that nonequity factors 
play an important role in determining whether or not borrowers exercise their default 
option. One weakness of the empirical analysis in Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) is the 
low number of defaulted loans in the sample. Of the 348 loans in the sample, only 3 7 
32 Borrower-related variables include such things as the marital status of the borrower, 
whether or not income is commission-based, length of employment, number of 
dependents, and the sex of the borrower. Loan-related variables include the expected 
loan balance to market value ratio and the contemporaneous mortgage payment to 
household income ratio. 
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defaulted. Of the 2,073 observations created for the empirical tests, only 37 have a 
dependent variable equal to one.33 
Giliberto and Houston (1989) develop a theoretical model of the default decision 
that incorporates relocation costs/benefits. Borrowers are assumed to take actions that 
will maximize their wealth. Wealth is defined as: 
W =NW+ E + max[MB0 - MV - RFNC] + h0 , 
where NW = nonhousing wealth, 
E = book value of equity 
Mb0 = the current principal balance on the mortgage, 
MV = the value of the mortgage to the borrower, 
RFNC = cost of refinancing the mortgage, 
h0 = H0 - H, where H0 is the value of the property to the owner, and His 
the current market value of the property. 
If the borrower is offered the opportunity to relocate, wealth depends on whether 
the borrower defaults or pays off the loan. If the borrower does not default, wealth is 
determined by nonhousing wealth, NW, book equity, E, selling costs, SC, the present 
value of the income effects ofrelocating, Y, and moving costs, MC: 
W =NW+ E - SC+ Y - MC. 
If the borrower defaults, wealth is determined by nonhousing wealth, NW, the present 
value of the income effects ofrelocating, Y, moving costs, MC, and the present value of 
the cost of default to the borrower, K: 
W = NW - K + Y - MC. 
33 The 37 loans that defaulted would have dependent variables of zero (i.e., non-default) 
for every year except the year they defaulted. Therefore, the analysis includes only 37 
observations that defaulted out of the 2,073 observations used in the analysis. 
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This implies that, if the borrower must relocate, default will be optimal if -K > E - SC. 
For default to be optimal, net equity must be negative and the amount of negative net 
equity must be larger than the present value of the cost of defaulting. 
Giliberto and Houston (1989) show conditions under which the relocation 
decision is independent of the default decision and conditions under which the decisions 
are mutually dependent. Let 8 represent the present value of relocating. Let a represent 
the incremental wealth change from selling the residence and p represent the incremental 
wealth change from default. A borrower will always choose to relocate if a+ 8 > 0. The 
authors refer to this as a relocating borrower. Default will be optimal for the relocating 
borrower if B > a (-K > E - SC). 
Now consider a borrower facing a relocation opportunity where the present value 
of relocating is positive (8 > 0), but not high enough to make up for negative equity in the 
property ( a < 0 and a + 8 < 0). This borrower will relocate and default only if 8 + p > 0. 
Giliberto and Houston (1989) refer to this as a marginal relocator. This borrower will 
never relocate without defaulting. 
Finally, consider a borrower facing a relocation opportunity where 8 < 0. This 
borrower will never sell the property and relocate. To do so would reduce the borrower's 
net wealth. Giliberto and Houston (1989) refer to this as a default relocator. The 
borrower will only relocate if the increase in wealth from defaulting is sufficiently high to 
make 8 + p > 0. The borrower will default if the net gain from transferring the property 
loss to the lender is greater than the net cost of relocating. 
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This model indicates that the decision to default may be influenced by the value 
ofrelocation opportunities. For the relocating borrower, the incremental wealth change 
from default could be negative and default will still be optimal as long as j3 > a. For the 
default relocator, the incremental wealth change from default must be positive for default 
to be optimal since the present value of income from relocating is negative (8 < 0). This 
indicates that the relocation decision and the default decision are independent under some 
circumstances and mutually dependent in other circumstances. 
Another type of second generation research employs option-based models of 
default. In these models, default is viewed as a put option. Each payment period the 
borrower has the option to sell the home to the lender for the balance of the loan (Quercia 
and Stegman (1992)). In the option-based models, the borrower decides whether or not to 
exercise the default option based solely on the equity the borrower has in the property. If 
the borrower has negative equity, then default is expected. · : . 
Foster and Van Order (1984) develop two theoretical models for default. The first 
model is a pure option-based model where the borrower will default if the market value 
of the residence falls below the present value of the mortgage. In this model, the number 
of defaults, D1, is equal to the number of loans with negative equity, C1• 
The second model assumes there are transactions costs associated with selling the 
residence and with exercising the option to default on the mortgage. It also assumes 
something happens to force the borrower to move out of the residence. Given that the 
borrower must move out of the residence, default will not occur if the equity in the home 
is greater than the costs associated with selling the residence. 
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Default may occur if net equity is negative. Let e represent net equity and d 
represent the transactions costs associated with defaulting on the mortgage. The 
borrower can default and pay d or sell the residence and receive e ( or pay if e is negative). 
If net equity is negative such that e < -d, the borrower will be better off defaulting than 
selling the residence. 
According to Foster and Van Order (1984), borrowers may also default when net 
equity is negative but exceeds the cost of exercising the default option (0 > e > -d). 
Assume Pis the market price of the home and Pis the borrower's subjective value of the 
home. Given negative net equity, P - P represents the borrower's subjective loss in 
holding the house. If the subjective loss from holding the house exceeds the net cost of 
default ( e + d), the borrower will default. Foster and Van Order's (1984) second model is 
written as: 
D, = PJC11 + P2C2,, 
where D1 is the number of defaults on the FHA-insured loans in the sample for each time 
period t, Cu is the number of loans in the sample where net equity is negative, but greater 
than the cost of exercising the default option, C21 is the number of loans in the sample 
where net equity is negative and less than the cost of exercising the default option, and p1 
and p2 represent the probability of default given C1 and C2, respectively. According to the 
model, all borrowers in C2 should default, and many of the borrowers in C1 should 
default, but default may not be immediate. Therefore, lagged values of C1 and C2 may be 
important. If default is immediate for borrowers in C2, lagged values of C2 will not be 
important and p2 should be equal to one. 
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Foster and Van Order (1984) use FHA data from 1960 through 1978 that includes 
information from the endorsement year through the disposition of the loan. The authors 
calculate contemporaneous equity by simulating changes in house prices under the 
assumption that price changes follow a symmetric, stable Paretian distribution. They also 
calculate loan balances and the market value of the mortgages.34 The final regression 
model includes C2, C1, and C1 lagged one, two, and three periods, the expected inflation 
rate, the divorce rate, the housing expense to income ratio, and the age of the loan. All 
equity related variables enter the model through C1 and C2• Foster and Van Order (1984) 
use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the model. The empirical tests 
lead Foster and Van Order (1984) to reject the simple option-based model of default that 
ignores transactions costs, but they find support for the model that incorporates 
transactions costs. 
Riddiough (1991) focuses on using option.-based methodology to price mortgages. 
Like Foster and Van Order (1984), he views the default decision as the intersection of 
two events. Riddiough (1991) hypothesizes that equity is the major determinant in the 
borrower's default decision, but borrowers with negative equity will continue paying their 
mortgage unless a trigger event occurs that forces them to move from their residence. 
34 Foster and Van Order's empirical tests rely on several assumptions. Loan balances are 
calculated assuming borrower's pay exactly the required payment each month and the 
required payment is calculated using average loan rates for the endorsement year. In their 
empirical tests, Foster and Van Order (1984) also assume the p's are constant across the 
sample. 
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C. Third Generation Research 
Third generation research does little to add to the theoretical models of the 
borrower's default decision (Quercia and Stegman (1992)). These investigations focus on 
(1) expanding the discussion on the role of transactions costs in the option-based models 
of default and (2) estimating the fraction of large loan pools that will default. 
Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) investigate the importance of transactions costs in 
the borrower's default decision. They develop a partial differential equation for the 
probability of default under the assumption that borrowers will make optimal decisions 
with regard to wealth. Based on the partial differential equation developed for the 
probability of default, the authors use numerical analysis to determine default 
probabilities for mortgages. 
Using base parametersof90 percent loan-to-value ratio, 9 percent contract 
interest rate, 8 percent market interest rate, 30 year mortgage, 10 percent interest rate 
volatility and 10 percent house price volatility, Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) calculate 
the probability of default over the life of the loan to be 5.15 percent. Lowering the loan-
to-value ratio to 80 percent decreases the probability of default to 0.76 percent while 
increasing the loan-to-value ratio to 95 percent increases the probability of default to 
10.52 percent. 
House price variances also play an important role in the model. If the variance in 
house prices increases from 10 percent to 15 percent, the probability of default increases 
from 5.15 percent to 11.63 percent. Decreasing the variance in house prices to 5 percent 
reduces the probability of default to 0.28%. 
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The authors provide an example using the base parameters to show that default 
will not be optimal as soon as net equity becomes negative, even in the absence of 
transactions costs. They use an example where a borrower takes out a $90,000 loan on a 
house valued at $100,000. Again, using the base parameter values provided earlier, the 
authors calculate the amount of house price depreciation that would be necessary to make 
default optimal after two years. They find that default will not be optimal after two years 
unless the market value of the house drops below $77,234. This represents a 23 percent 
decline in the value since loan origination (2 years) and the borrower's equity position in 
the house would be approximately -$12,200.35 
This result is not explained by transactions costs, since there are no transactions 
costs in the model. Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) argue that borrowers will not find it 
optimal to exercise the default option until equity is significantly negative because to do 
so requires they give up the right to exercise the option in the future. The default option 
has value, and that value is lost when the mortgage is terminated.36 
Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) conclude there is no evidence that transactions costs 
play a role in borrowers' decisions whether or not to exercise the default option. Based 
on their analysis and observed default rates in the market, the authors conclude that 
borrowers exercise the default option when it is rational to do so. 
Lekkas et. al. (1993) test the option-based model of default to determine if the 
empirical evidence is consistent with the frictionless model or if transactions costs play a 
35 The authors calculate the principal balance of the loan after two years to be $89,436. 
36 The option to prepay the mortgage is also lost when the mortgage is terminated. 
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role in the default decision. Transactions costs that may influence the decision to 
exercise the default option include moving costs and reputation costs. 
Lekkas et. al. (1993) develop four empirically testable propositions about loan 
loss severities that should hold if the frictionless model of default is accurate (i.e., if 
transactions costs don't matter). The first proposition is that the severity of losses on 
defaulted loans should fall as initial loan-to-value ratio increases. This proposition arises 
from the assumption that high loan-to-value ratio loans will have mortgage insurance. 
The effect of mortgage insurance premiums is to increase the effective coupon rate on the 
loan. Increasing the effective coupon rate on the loan increases the cost of keeping the 
option alive. Therefore, borrowers paying mortgage insurance premiums will find default 
to be optimal before borrowers not paying mortgage insurance premiums, all else equal. 
The result is that high loan-to-value ratio loans will have a higher probability of default 
and less loss severity on defaulted loans than low loan-to-value ratio loans. 
The second proposition is that loss severity on defaulted loans should be 
independent of the region of the country or the year the loan is originated. The economic 
conditions in different regions will influence default rates, but should not influence loss 
severities on defaulted loans if the frictionless model holds. 
The third proposition is that loss severity on defaulted loans should decrease with 
the age of the mortgage. As the mortgage ages, the time premium associated with the 
default option gets smaller, decreasing the value of the default option. Therefore, the 
older the mortgage is, the earlier the default option will be exercised. 
The fourth proposition is that loss severity on defaulted loans should decrease as 
the differential between the coupon rate and the current market interest rate increases 
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( coupon rate minus current market rate). Higher coupon rates increase the cost of 
keeping the option alive, so borrowers will exercise the option earlier. 37 
Lekkas et. al. (1993) use data on single-family, owner-occupied loans purchased 
by Freddie Mac during the period 1975-1990. Loss severity is measured as the difference 
in the mortgage balance and the value of the house at default. The value of the house at 
default is measured two ways: (1) the appraised value at the time of default, and (2) the 
sales price received by Freddie Mac when the home is sold. 
The authors test the propositions by estimating a regression model with six 
dummy variables for different ranges ofloan-to-value ratios, the age of the mortgage, the 
coupon minus current market rate, and a dummy variable for loans on property located in 
Texas. The dependent variable is the actual loss severity on defaulted loans. The model 
is estimated for both specifications of the value of the house at default. 
Lekkas et. al. (1993) find loss severities increase with loan-to-value ratios, 
contrary to the first proposition. Loss severities are also significantly higher for Texas 
loans than for other loans, contrary to the second proposition. The age of the mortgage is 
found to have a negative impact on loss severities from default, consistent with the third 
proposition. Finally, the sign of coupon minus current rate is ambiguous in the two 
specifications of the dependent variable and is not significant in either specification. 
These findings lead the authors to reject the frictionless model of default. 
37 If the differential is significant enough, the borrower will want to terminate the 
mortgage, either through prepayment (refinancing) or default. This should make the 
borrower more likely to default at all levels of negative equity. 
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Hendershott and Schultz ( 1993) conduct an empirical investigation of the 
determinants of claims on FHA-insured single-family mortgages. Using FHA data on 
loans insured during the 1975-1987 period, the authors estimate a model to predict the 
conditional claim rate for each year. The conditional claim rate is the number of claims 
made during the policy year, t, on loans originated in year, y, that are still in the loan pool 
at the beginning of the policy year, t. 
The data is subdivided into seven categories based on the size of the loan. 
Therefore, for any given origination year and policy year, there are 7 separate calculated 
conditional claim rates. For example, loans originated in 1975 are placed into one of 
seven size categories. For each policy year, 1975-1990, there are seven conditional claim 
rates for loans originated in 1975. Since there are 16 policy years (1975 through 1990), 
there are 112 separate conditional claim rates calculated on mortgages originated in 
1975.38 
Independent variables included in the model are (1) the expected percentage 
market equity, (2) the expected percentage book equity, (3) a measure of house price 
dispersion since the origination date, and (4) the unemployment rate. These variables are 
used to estimate a semi-log probability model as shown: 
13 7 
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i=l i-1 
38 For loans originated in 1987, there are only four policy years. Therefore, there would 
be 28 conditional claim rates for loans originated in 1987. In all, there are 931 
conditional claim rates. 
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where CC~.y.t is the conditional claim rate, Di,t equals one in policy year i and zero 
otherwise. The percentage market equity, EM, percentage book equity, EB, 
unemployment rate, U, and home price dispersion, DISP, are measured as deviations 
from their mean values. The first term in the equation is the claim rate in policy year i for 
average economic conditions (i.e., when EM = EM, EB = EB, V = V, DISP = DISP). 
Hendershott and Schultz (1993) find all four independent variables are important 
in explaining conditional claim rates. They find claim rates are negatively related to the 
percentage market equity and the percentage book equity. Higher claim rates are 
positively related to house price dispersion and unemployment rates. Claim rates 
increase rapidly as the initial loan-to-value ratio is increased. Loans with initial loan-to-
value ratios of 96 percent are 20 times more likely to be foreclosed iri the fifth policy year 
than loans with initial loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent. The authors also find the impact 
of market and book equity are three times higher for loans with initial loan-to-value ratios 
of 95-97 percent than for loans with initial loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent. 
Schwartz and Torous (1993) use a methodology similar to Hendershott and 
Schultz (1993) to investigate mortgage prepayment and default. The authors estimate 
separate Poisson regression models to predict prepayments and defaults using Freddie 
Mac data on 1-4 family, 30-year fixed rate loans originated from 1975 to 1990. The 
dependent variable in the default equation is the quarterly probability of default. 
The data is identified by origination year and policy year as in j-Iendershott and 
Schultz (1993). Explanatory variables in the default model include (1) dummy variables 
-
for the region of the country, (2) initial loan-to-value ratios, (3) housing return and 
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volatility in return, ( 4) interest rate data including interest rate volatility and the slope of 
the term structure, and (5) the age of the mortgage. 
The authors find that mortgages in the Southwest have the highest probability of 
default, and mortgages in the Northeast have the lowest probability of default. They also 
find the initial loan-to-value ratio and the volatility in housing returns are positively 
related to loan default. The degree to which increases in the initial loan-to-value ratios 
increase the probability of default is not the same for all regions. Increasing the initial 
loan-to-value ratio from 80 percent to 90 percent increases the quarterly probability of 
default from about 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent in the Southwest, but only increases the 
quarterly probability of default from 0.15 percent to 0.20 percent in the Northeast.39 The 
impact of housing index volatility on the probability of default is also much greater for 
mortgages originated in the Southwest than for mortgages originated in the Northeast. 
D. Current State of the Research on Residential Loan Defaults 
Investigations of residential loan defaults consistently find home equity influences 
the default decision. Option-based models of default indicate home equity should have 
the dominant effect. The current debate on the option-based models of default focus on 
the role of transactions costs and the value of deferring the exercise of the default option. 
Several investigations have provided evidence that other factors besides home 
equity influence the default decision. Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) and Giliberto and 
Houston (1989) develop models of the default decision where non-equity factors 
39 This assumes other variables are held constant at their mean values. 
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influence the default decision. They also indicate that default is more likely if some 
"trigger event" forces the borrower to move. 
The model of the loan decision in the next chapter incorporates a model of the 
borrower's default decision. The model of the borrower's default decision reflects the 




THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A. Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical loan decision model and a theoretical analysis 
of discrimination in lending. The theoretical loan decision model is developed to show 
what factors are important in determining whether or not a loan should be approved. The 
theoretical lending model assumes owner wealth maximizing behavior by lenders. 
The theoretical analysis of discrimination in lending develops expected 
relationships in loan denial and default rates that can result from discrimination when 
credit quality is identical for nonminority and minority applicants (homogeneous) and 
when nonminority applicants have a higher distribution of credit quality (tend to be more 
creditworthy) than minority applicants (heterogeneous). The analysis also shows the 
effect of noise in estimating credit quality when the distribution of credit quality is 
heterogeneous. 
The owner wealth maximizing model developed in this chapter will be used to 
develop an equal outcome model in the next chapter. The owner wealth maximizing 
model and the equal outcome model should include all of the same variables if the 
distribution of credit quality is homogeneous with respect to race. If the distribution of 
credit quality is heterogeneous with respect to race, the equal outcome model will include 
some, but not all, of the variables in the owner wealth maximizing model. 
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H A Theoretical Mortgage Loan Decision Model 
This section develops a theoretical model of the credit decision which assumes all 
positive risk-adjusted net present value (NPV) loans will be accepted. The purpose of 
this model is to provide the theoretical basis for an owner wealth maximizing empirical 
model of the credit decision that does not consider race. The empirical owner wealth 
maximizing model will be estimated to determine if it produces racial disparities in 
mortgage lending decisions. A solid theoretical basis for the empirical model is 
important to establish that the empirical model correctly represents credit decisions that 
maximize shareholder wealth without consideration for race. Without this development, 
pure racial prejudice or a faulty credit decision process cannot be ruled out. This 
theoretical credit decision model assumes lenders accept all positive net present value 
(NPV) loans and borrowers make rational decisions to maximize the present value of 
their wealth. The theoretical model also provides a detailed analysis of the borrower's 
default decision and incorporates the default analysis into the credit decision model. 
Most previous models of the credit decision are empirical models with little or no 
theoretical justification. A few of the models, such as Munnell et. al. (1996) are based on 
maximizing the profitability of the loan by minimizing the probability of default. 
However, these models do not include any analysis of the borrower's default decision. 
They simply include empirical variables the investigator(s) think should measure default 
risk. 
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1. Assumptions of the Model 
The theoretical mortgage lending model makes the following simplifying 
assumptions: (1) all loans are fixed-rate loans, (2) all loans have the same term to 
maturity, (3) all loans are fully amortizing loans requiring principal and interest payments 
at the beginning of each month, ( 4) all loans are either granted at the prevailing market 
interest rate or denied, and (5) prepayment risk exists but it is not considered in making 
the decision of whether or not a borrower meets creditworthiness standards to be 
approved for a loan. The assumption that all loans are fixed-rate loans simply implies the 
model developed in this chapter could not be directly applied to underwriting adjustable 
rate loans. Underwriting adjustable rate loans requires additional considerations and 
these loans are not the focus of this research. Empirical tests will use only fixed-rate 
loans. 
The assumption that all loans have the same term to maturity implies that a lender 
underwriting loans to two different borrowers at the same time will apply the same term 
premium to both loans. Using this assumption, the model will develop the argument that 
default risk is the primary determinant in whether or not a loan is approved. All loans in 
the empirical tests will have the same loan term to maturity. 
The assumption that all loans are fully amortizing loans requiring principal and 
interest payments at the beginning of each month along with the assumption that all loans 
have the same loan term to maturity leads to the conclusion that the timing of expected 
cash flows from all residential mortgage loans will be the same. All loans in the 
empirical tests are fully amortizing loans. 
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The assumption that all loans are either approved at the prevailing market 
mortgage rate simplifies the model and is consistent with previous residential mortgage 
lending models and current underwriting practices. The majority of the evidence 
suggests that credit is rationed in this manner in the single family residential mortgage 
market. Tootell (1993) and Munnell et. al. (1996) assume a single market interest rate for 
mortgages that is applied to all loans that meet minimum underwriting standards. Tootell 
(1993) cites King (1980) as providing evidence supporting the theory of a single market 
interest rate. 
Lenders selling loans in the secondary market will be unlikely to charge lower 
rates for higher quality loans, since the loans would have to be sold at a lower price in the 
secondary market. Lenders will also be hesitant to charge higher rates to marginally less 
qualified minority borrowers and take the risk of being sued for discrimination. Barefoot 
(1995) indicates lenders are concerned about the "regulatory risks" ofrisk-based pricing 
even though it has been encouraged by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan 
Greenspan. Barefoot (1995) points to Justice Department settlements with American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company of Madison, Wisconsin and First National Bank of 
Vicksburg, Mississippi where risk-based pricing led to charges of racial discrimination. 
Barefoot (1995) also states that the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) prohibits charging interest rates that vary by more than two points in the same 
geographic area. 
The assumption that prepayment risk exists but does not play a role in the loan 
underwriter's decision also simplifies the model and also appears to be consistent with 
actual underwriting practices. Theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of 
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mortgage prepayments indicate the dominant factors are the equity the borrower has in 
the home and the difference between the market interest rate and the contract interest rate 
on the loan. Prepayments are believed to be positively related to home equity and 
negatively related to the market interest rate minus the contract interest rate.40 Research 
on loan defaults indicate the higher the borrower's home equity, the less likely the 
borrower is to default.41 Since prepayment risk and default risk are inversely related, 
lenders face a tradeoff between high prepayment risk and high default risk. Therefore, 
the ramifications of prepayments and defaults must be considered to determine which will 
play a dominant role in the loan underwriting process. 
The loss from prepayment depends on whether or not the loan is sold in the 
secondary market. The model makes no assumption in this regard. If the lender holds the 
loan in the portfolio, the maximum loss from prepayment is the opportunity cost of 
continuing to earn the contract rate of interest. No principal is lost. If the loan is sold in 
the secondary market, there is no loss from prepayment to the originator of the loan. 
The loss from default also depends on whether or not the loan is sold in the 
secondary market. If the lender holds the loan in the portfolio, there are real losses from 
default. Even if the principal balance is eventually recovered, there are economic losses 
associated with time delays before the loan is settled. If the loan is sold in the secondary 
market without recourse, there is no immediate financial loss from the default but if 
4° Kau et. al. (1993) and Foster and Van Order (1985) hypothesize these relationships. 
Foster and Van Order (1985) test their model empirically and find strong support for 
these relationships. 
41 This relationship has been found in numerous investigations. Examples are von 
Furstenberg (1969), Jackson and Kaserman (1980) and Campbell and Dietrich (1983). 
79 
default rates on loans sold by a particular lender are perceived to be too high the lender 
may not be able to sell loans in the secondary market in the future. 
It is obvious that lenders should prefer high prepayment risk to high default risk. 
Since there is an inverse relationship between prepayment risk and default risk, the model 
assumes lenders place more importance on default risk. Therefore, the model allows for 
borrower prepayment, but prepayment risk is not considered in making the decision of 
whether or not a borrower meets creditworthiness standards to be approved for a loan. 
This appears to be consistent with actual underwriting practices. Lenders know 
borrowers may prepay loans but loan underwriters do not deny loans to borrowers who 
are high prepayment risks. This is also supported by empirical research. Research that 
models the loan decision of the lender and empirically tests these models find higher 
home equity (i.e., larger downpayments) increases the probability the loan will be 
approved. According to the expected influence of home equity on the probability of 
default and prepayment, this indicates lenders focus on the probability of default and do 
not deny loans to individuals who are high prepayment risks. 
It follows from the inverse relationship between the probability of default and the 
probability of prepayment that borrowers with high prepayment risk will tend to have low 
default risk. Rejecting applicants for being high prepayment risks would eliminate the 
most creditworthy borrowers from the pool of borrowers. Lenders face considerable legal 
liability if creditworthy minority applicants are rejected for being high prepayment risks. 
Lenders would have considerable difficulty convincing regulators and the judicial system 
that an otherwise highly qualified minority applicant was denied a loan because the 
lender feared the applicant would pay off the loan prior to maturity. 
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2. The Credit Decision of the Lender 
a. The Net Present Value Rule, Value Additivity, and Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization 
One of the foundations of finance theory is that the primary goal of a firm's 
managers is the maximization of shareholder wealth. Theory indicates the NPV rule 
should be used in making investment decisions because this approach satisfies the value-
additivity principle and maximizes shareholder wealth. The value additivity principle 
says the value of the firm is the sum of the value of the firm's investment projects. 
Assuming there are N projects, the value of the firm is: 
(1) 
where Vi is the value of investmentj. The value additivity principle holds that projects 
can be evaluated independently of one another. 
The NPV of an investment is found by calculating the present value of its cash 
flows at the discount rate appropriate for the risk of the investment and then subtracting 
the required initial investment (i.e., the cost of the investment). A positive NPV indicates 
the value of the investment is greater than the cost of the investment. The aggregate 
wealth of the firm will increase by the NPV of the investment project. Managers should 
undertake all positive NPV investments to maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore, the 
correct decision rule for evaluating investment proposals is to accept all proposals that 
have a NPV greater than zero. This decision rule will maximize shareholder wealth. 
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b. The Net Present Value Rule and Financial Institutions 
Managers of financial institutions seek investments that will maximize 
shareholder wealth. The loan selection process can be viewed as an investment decision 
where the manager of the financial institution chooses only those investments with 
positive NPV' s because this will maximize shareholder wealth. 
The decision to grant a fixed-rate residential mortgage loan can be based on the 
NPV rule. The NPV is determined by (1) the amount and timing of the cash flows and 
(2) the required rate of return, ri, on the loan. The amount of the cash flows from a fixed-
rate residential mortgage loan is determined by the dollar amount of funds loaned and the 
contract mortgage interest rate. 
The contractual rate of interest, r, is a function of (1) the risk-free rate of interest, 
re, (2) a term premium, Tp, and (3) a default risk premium, DP, which is the default risk 
premium for marginal loans.42 The default risk premium is the same for all loans that 
meet or exceed the underwriting standards because it was argued that it is not 
economically rational for mortgage lenders to charge different interest rates on mortgage 
contracts with the same terms. 43 There is no default risk pricing in the loan terms. The 
contractual rate is defined as: 
42 The default risk premium, Dp, on marginal loans is the default risk premium that 
would apply to a borrower with qualifications identical to the minimum underwriting 
standards that will permit sale on the secondary market. This assumes lenders want to 
have the option to sell loans in the secondary market. 
43 This assumes all loans have the same term to maturity. The empirical research uses a 
sample of 30 year fixed-rate mortgage loans. 
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(2) 
The borrower's required rate ofreturn, ri, on the loan is determined by (1) the risk-free 
rate of interest, rf, (2) a term premium, Tp, and (3) a default premium, DP: 
(3) 
If two borrowers apply for 30 year fixed rate mortgage loans at the same time, any 
differences in the lender's required rate of return, ri, on the loans must be due to the 
difference in the default premiums since the risk-free rate and the term premium are 
identical for the two borrowers. The default premium, DP, is unique to each loan and is 
determined by the probability the borrower will default on the loan and the amount of the 
expected loss from default. 
The NPV of a mortgage loan is a function of the stream of cash flows (loan 
payments), the required rate ofreturn, and the loan amount, where 
LOAN PAYMENT= LOAN AMOUNT 
1 1 ' 
(4) 
r r(l + r) 1 
where r = coupon interest rate on the loan (prevailing market mortgage interest rate), and 
NPV =±LOAN PA~~ENTt - LOAN AMOUNT' (5) 
1=1 (1 + ri 
where ri = the required rate of return on the loan. Whether or not a loan's NPV is positive 
depends only on the relationship of the required rate of return on the loan, ri, to the 
prevailing market mortgage interest rate, r. This relationship is directly dependent on the 
relationship of the default premium on the marginally qualified borrower, DP, and the 
specific default premium, DP. If DP < DP , then ri < r and the loan will have a positive 
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NPV. If DP> DP, then ri >rand the loan will have a negative NPV. The NPV will 




The risk free rate, term premium and the default premium for the loan are embedded in 
the prevailing market mortgage interest rate. The required rate of return, ri, will be 
greater than the prevailing market interest rate, r, if the borrower's default premium is 
higher than the default premium on the marginal loan, i.e., DP >DP. The marginal loan 
will have a net present value of zero. The determination of whether the NPV on a loan 
will be positive or negative depends primarily on the borrower's probability of default and 
the expected loss from default. 
The magnitude of the NPV is also influenced by the amount of the loan. Given a 








Since the lender denies loans when ri > r, only the case where ri < r is relevant. 
In the absence of capital rationing, all loans with a required rate of return, ri, below the 
prevailing market interest rate, r, will be approved. The only borrower-specific factor 
(7) 
(8) 
used to determine the required rate of return on the loan is the default risk premium for 
the borrower, which is a measure of the lender's assessment of the probability of default 
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and the expected loss from default. The higher the probability of default and expected 
loss from default, the higher the default risk premium for the borrower. The default risk 
premium for marginal loans, DP , reflects the maximum acceptable probability of loss 
and expected loss from default. Therefore, the probability of default and expected loss 
from default are the major determinants in the loan decision. The probability of loan 
approval, P(APPROVE), is a function of (1) the probability the borrower will default on 
the loan, P(DEFAULT), and (2) the amount of the expected loss from default, 
EXPLOSS: 
P(APPROVE) = f(P(DEFAULT), EXPLOSS). (9) 
The probability the loan will be approved is inversely related to the probability of default 
and the amount of the expected loss from default: 
8P(APPROVE) 8P(APPROVE) < O. 
8P(DEFAULT)' 8EXPLOSS 
(10) 
The borrower's default decision must be incorporated into the credit decision framework 
because the probability of default is the major determinant in the credit decision. The 
model of the borrower's default decision is presented in the next section. 
3. The Default Decision From the Borrower's Perspective 
Borrowers are assumed to maximize utility by maximizing wealth. Therefore, 
they are assumed to prefer more wealth to less wealth, and to make rational decisions 
consistent with maximizing the present value of their expected future cash flows. This is 
consistent with the NPV rule (Brealey and Myers (1988)). Borrowers make decisions 
85 
regarding loan repayment at the beginning of each month, t. A flowchart of the 
borrower's default decision involves four decision points and is shown in Figure 5. 
The first decision point (#1) involves an examination of net equity. The borrower 
will not default if the following condition holds: 
Where Vt equals the current market value of the residence, C equals the costs associated 
with selling the residence and Lt is the principal balance outstanding on the loan. If the 
borrower's net equity is positive, default will not occur because it would (at least) cost the 
borrower the positive equity CVt - C - Li)44• At this point, if a borrower experiences a 
crisis event that forces the borrower to move from the residence, the borrower is better off 
selling the residence than defaulting on the loan (since Vt - C - Lt is positive). The 
second decision point (#2) shows that even if the borrower's equity is negative, default 
will not occur if the value the borrower places on a default-free credit rating, REP, 
exceeds the negative net equity to be gained from defaulting (REP> Lt - (Vt - C)).45 If a 
crisis event occurs in this case, the gain from defaulting would not be worth the loss of a 
default-free credit rating. 
If the net equity is negative and greater than the value of a default-free credit 
rating (Lt - (Vt - C) > REP), then the borrower is better off to default than to sell. In this 
case, either of two conditions are sufficient for default to be optimal. If, for some 
44 This is rational and is consistent with option-based models of default such as Foster and 
Van Order (1984). 
45 Lekkas et. al. (1993) argue that reputation costs may prevent borrowers from defaulting 
when the default option is in the money. 
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FIGURES 
THE BORROWER'S DEFAULT DECISION 
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reason, the borrower must move from the residence, default is optimal ( decision point 
#3). The inability to continue living in the residence could result from a disruption in 
employment, a significant reduction in income, a significant increase in expenses, or 
some other crisis event. These events are compounded if the borrower lacks sufficient 
financial resources to overcome the crisis event. 
A second condition sufficient to justify default may exist if the present value of 
the savings from defaulting is greater than the net value of the residence plus the value of 
a default-free credit rating even if the borrower can continue living in the residence 
(decision point #4). The borrower can continue to pay the monthly cost of 
homeownership, HE, which includes principal, interest, taxes, insurance, maintenance 
costs, less the tax benefits from homeownership. Continuing payments entitles the 
borrower to maintain ownership of the residence, which has a net value of 
Vt- C. The borrower will also be able to maintain a default-free credit rating, REP. 
Therefore, the benefit of continuing to make payments is Vt - C + REP. The benefit from 
defaulting on the loan is the present value of the difference between the monthly cost of 
homeownership and the monthly cost to rent a comparable residence, RENT. Default 
will only be optimal if the present value of the savings from defaulting is greater than the 
net value of the residence plus the value of a default-free credit rating 
(PV {HE - RENT} > Vt - C + REP). The discount rate used to calculate the present value 
of the savings from defaulting is the borrower's cost ofnonhousing debt. If the present 
value of the savings from defaulting is greater than the net value of the residence plus the 
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value of a default-free credit rating, the homeowner could obtain funds at the nonhousing 
debt rate of r* and use the monthly savings from defaulting to repay the loan. 
To summarize, default will be optimal when the borrower's equity is negative and 
the benefit from defaulting exceeds the value of a default-free credit rating, 
Lt - { (Vt - C} > REP), if one of two conditions exists. First, default will be optimal if the 
borrower cannot continue living in the residence. Second, default will be optimal if the 
present value of the savings from defaulting is greater than the net value of the residence 
plus the value of a default-free credit rating (PV {HE - RENT} > Vt - C + REP). 
The borrower's default decision is therefore a function of ( 1) the market value of 
the residence, Vt, (2) costs associated with selling the residence, C, (3) the outstanding 
loan balance, Lt, (4) the value the borrower places on having a default-free credit rating, 
REP, (5) the monthly cost of homeownership, HE, (6) the monthly rental cost for a 
comparable dwelling, RENT, (7) the borrower's cost ofnonhousing debt, i*, (8) the 
financial resources of the borrower, FINRES, and (9) the probability of a crisis event, 
P(CRISIS): 
P(DEFAULT) = f(Vt, C, Lt, REP, HE RENT, r*, FINRES, P(CRISIS)). (11) 
Increases in the current market value of the residence, Vt, increase the net equity of the 
borrower and reduce the probability of default. Increases in the value placed on having a 
default free credit rating, REP, decrease the probability of default. Higher values of REP 
mean negative net equity must be higher for default to be optimal. Increases in the cost to 
rent a comparable dwelling, RENT, make default less likely, since the savings from 
defaulting will be smaller. Increases in the borrower's cost of nonhousing debt, r*, 
decrease the present value of the benefits from defaulting and decrease the. probability of 
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default. Increases in financial resources, FINRES, decrease the probability of default 
because borrowers with strong financial resources are more likely to be able to overcome 
other negative factors. 
Increases in the costs associated with selling the residence, C, and the outstanding 
loan balance, L" reduce the net equity of the borrower and increase the probability of 
default. Increases in the monthly cost of homeownership, HE, increase the savings from 
defaulting, making default more likely. Finally, the higher the probability of a crisis 
event, P(CRISIS), the higher the probability of default. Crisis events may force 
borrowers to move, making default more likely. The marginal impact of each variable on 
the probability of default is: 
t3P(DEFAULT) t3P(DEFAULT) t3P(DEFAULT) tJP(DEFAULT) tJP(DEFAULT) 
t3Vt ' t3REP ' t3RENT ' or* ' t3FINRES < O, 
t3 P(DEFA ULT) t3 P( DEFAULT) t3 P( DEFAULT) t3 P(DEFA ULT) 
t3C t3L1 t3HE ' t3P(CRJS1S) > O 02) 
4. The Full Mortgage Loan Decision Model 
The lender's decision to approve a loan is hypothesized to be a function of the 
probability of default and the amount of the expected loss from default. The previous 
section developed a framework for the borrower's default decision. The theoretical credit 
decision model for fixed-rate residential loans is completed by incorporating the 
borrower's default decision into the loan approval decision. If equation 11 is substituted 
into equation 9, the decision to approve a loan is a function (1) the value of the residence, 
V,, (2) the costs associated with selling the residence, C, (3) the outstanding loan balance, 
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1 1, (4) the value the borrower places on having a default-free credit rating, REP, (5) the 
monthly cost of homeownership, HE, (6) the monthly rental rate for a comparable 
dwelling,·RENT, (7) the borrower's cost ofnonhousing debt, r*, (8) the financial 
resources of the borrower, FINRES, (9) the probability of a crisis event, P(CRISIS), and 
(10) the expected loss from default, EXPLOSS: 
P(APPROVE)= f(V,,C,L,, REP, HE,RENT,r*,FINRES,P(CRISIS),EXPLOSS). (13) 
Any factor that increases the probability of default decreases the probability of loan 
approval. The probability of default increases with increases in the costs associated with 
selling the residence, C, the outstanding loan balance, 1 1, the monthly cost of 
- ·-· -
homeownership, HE, and the probability of a crisis event, P(CRISIS). Therefore, 
increases in these factors decrease the probability of loan approval. Increases in the value 
of the residence, V1, the value the borrower places on having a default-free credit rating, 
REP, the monthly rental cost for a comparable dwelling, RENT, the borrower's cost of 
nonhousing debt, r*, and the financial resources of the borrower, FINRES, decrease the 
probability of loan default. These variables should be positively related to the probability 
of loan approval. The marginal impact of each variable on the probability that the loan 
will be approved is shown: 
iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) 
iJC iJL1 iJHE ' iJP(CRISIS) < O, 
(14) 
iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) iJP(APPROVE) 
iJREP iJRENT or* iJFINRES > O. 
The theoretical credit decision model hypothesizes the only borrower-specific risk 
that is considered is the risk of default. Therefore, default risk is believed to play the 
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dominant role in the credit decision. The theoretical credit decision model developed in 
this chapter is estimated with an empirical model, referred to as the owner wealth 
maximizing model. 
C. A Theoretical Analysis of Discrimination in Lending 
As developed in Chapter I, racial disparities in lending can result from three 
things: (1) taste-based discrimination, (2) owner wealth maximizing lending decisions, 
and (3) statistical discrimination. This investigation assumes that any taste-based 
discrimination in lending takes the form of marginal minority applicants being held to a 
higher standard than nonminority applicants. Longhofer (1996) indicates that taste-based 
discrimination occurs by requiring members of the "disfavored" group to meet higher 
cutoff standards. Hunter and Walker (1995) find race plays no role in the outcome of 
loan applications when applicants are of high quality, but race significantly impacts 
outcomes for marginal loan applications. This indicates that taste-based discrimination 
either does not exist, or it occurs only among marginally qualified minority applicants. 
Statistical discrimination occurs when lenders use variables correlated with race that do 
not measure the probability of loan default or the expected loss from default. Lenders use 
proxies to determine the creditworthiness of the borrower. Therefore, the 
creditworthiness of the borrower is measured with noise. This research assumes that the 
majority of all discrimination is statistical discrimination, and that discrimination occurs 
only among marginally qualified applicants. 
92 
The impact of statistical discrimination on loan denial and default rates for 
nonminority and minority borrowers depends on two factors. The first factor is whether 
the distribution of credit quality is the same for all borrowers (i.e., homogeneous), or 
whether the distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous with respect to race. The 
second factor is the amount and form of noise in the estimation of borrower 
creditworthiness. 
1. Homogeneous Borrowing Population With No Noise 
Ferguson and Peters (1995) show that the relationship between relative denial and 
default rates for nonminority and minority borrowers in a nondiscriminatory lending 
environment depend critically on their relative distributions of credit quality. Ferguson 
and Peters (1995) develop a model where the credit score of an applicant, 8, represents 
the probability of repayment. The probability of default for each borrower, by definition, 
is 1 - 8. A uniform, nondiscriminatory lending policy requires that all loans with credit 
quality above some cutoff, 8*, are approved and all loans with credit quality below 8* are 
denied. 
If nonminority and minority borrowers have the same distribution of credit 
quality, the borrowing population is homogeneous. An illustration of the Ferguson and 
Peters (1995) model with no discrimination and homogeneous credit quality is shown in 
Figure 6. Since the distribution of credit quality is identical, the average credit quality of 
A 
approved minority borrowers, Stt, is equal to the average credit quality of approved 
A 




HOMOGENEOUS CREDIT QUALITY WITH NO 
DISCRIMINATION 
h(B) = g(B) 
B* 
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minority borrowers should experience equal denial and default rates under a uniform, 
nondiscriminatory lending policy. If minorities are held to a higher standard, 8* + o, they 
will have higher denial rates and the average credit quality of approved minority 
borrowers will be greater than the average credit quality of approved nonminority 
borrowers. This is shown in Figure 7. Since the average default rate for minority 
A A 
borrowers is 1 - 8H and the average default rate for nonminority borrowers is 1 - Sa, 
minority borrowers will have lower default rates than nonminority borrowers in a 
discriminatory lending environment if credit quality is homogeneous.46 
2. Heterogeneous Borrowing Population With No Noise 
Ferguson and Peters (1995) point out that recent empirical evidence indicates the 
distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous with respect to nonminority and minority 
borrowers. Munnell et. al. (1996) find minority borrowers have, on average, greater debt 
burdens, higher loan-to-value ratios, and weaker credit histories than nonminority 
borrowers. Ferguson and Peters (1995) develop a model where the distribution of credit 
quality for nonminority borrowers first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of 
credit quality for minority borrowers. Under this condition, Ferguson and Peters (1995) 
show that nonminority borrowers will have higher average credit quality than minority 
46 This is the argument used by Becker (1993) and others to refute the findings of 
Munnell et. al. (1996). An implicit assumption of this argument is that the distribution of 




HOMOGENEOUS CREDIT QUALITY WITH 
DISCRIMINATION 





borrowers (i:e., ea > eH ).47 This is shown in Figure 8. Since the average credit quality 
/\ 
for nonminority borrowers, ea, is greater than the average credit quality for minority 
/\ 
borrowers, 8 H , minority borrowers will have higher denial and default rates than 
nonminority borrowers under a uniform, nondiscriminatory lending policy.48 From 
Figure 8, it is obvious that minority borrowers will have higher denial rates than 
nonminority borrowers under a uniform credit policy where all applicants with 
creditworthiness above e· are approved and all applicants with creditworthiness below e· 
I\ /\ 
are denied.49 Also, because G(S) first-order stochastically dominates H(S) and Stt <Sa, 
minority borrowers will have higher default rates than nonminority borrowers. so 
47 Since the lending policy approves all loans with credit quality above 8*, marginal 
minority applicants and marginal nonminority applicants may have identical 
characteristics but the average credit quality will be higher for nonminority borrowers 
than for minority borrowers. 
48 The explanation of racial disparities caused by owner wealth maximizing loan 
decisions assumes credit quality is heterogeneous with respect to race. If credit quality is 
homogeneous with respect to race, credit rationing will not affect minorities 
disproportionately. 
49 The area under the curve to the left of 8* represents denied applications. The area 
under the probability density function, h(S), to the left of 8* is greater than the area under 
a• a• 
the probability density function, g(S) to the left of 8* ( J h(S)de > J g(8)d8 ). 
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3. Implications of a Heterogeneous Borrowing Population 
The Ferguson and Peters (1995) investigation has important implications for 
research on discrimination in lending. One implication is that, assuming the borrowing 
population is heterogeneous, it is very difficult to discern discrimination from prudent 
lending by looking at relative denial and default rates. Ferguson and Peters (1995) show 
that only two combinations of denial and default rates lead to a finding of discrimination 
when the borrowing population is heterogeneous. First, if nonrninority borrowers have 
higher denial rates and lower default rates than minority borrowers, there is evidence of 
reverse discrimination. Second, if minority borrowers have higher denial rates and lower 
default rates than nonrninority borrowers, there is evidence of discrimination against 
minority borrowers. The expected relationship is that minority borrowers will have 
higher denial and default rates than nonrninority borrowers in a nondiscriminatory 
lending environment when the distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous.51 
4. The Effect of Noise in the Estimation of e 
As Ferguson and Peters (1995) show, the relative distribution of credit quality for 
nonrninority and minority borrowers is an important consideration when examining racial 
disparities in residential mortgage lending. An equally important consideration is the 
51 Minority borrowers could also have higher denial and default rates than nonrninority 
borrowers when there is discrimination against minority borrowers or discrimination 
against nonrninority borrowers. Ferguson and Peters (1995) show that, when the 
borrowing population has heterogeneous credit quality, the combination of higher denial 
and default rates for minority borrowers is consistent with no discrimination, 
discrimination against minorities, and discrimination against nonrninority. 
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effect of noise in estimating the credit quality of potential borrowers. Let e represent the 
borrower's true probability ofrepayment. Lenders must estimate e based on information 
they collect in underwriting the loan, since the borrower's true e is unobservable to the 
lender. To the extent that variables used by the lender are imperfect proxies for the true 
probability ofrepayment, there is noise in the estimation of e. Noise is defined here as 
incorrect estimates of the true probability of repayment, e, resulting from the use of 
imperfect or incorrect variables in the calculated probability of repayment. 
Let ec represent the lender's calculation of the probability of repayment for the 
borrower. The true probability of repayment, 8, is equal to the calculated probability of 
repayment, 8c, plus a measurement error, E: 8w = 8c + Ew for nonminority borrowers, 
w 
andeb = ecb + Eb for minority borrowers. Since the true probabilities ofrepayment, ew 
and eb, are unknown, the measurement errors, Ew and Eb, are unobservable. 
Ferguson and Peters (1997) show that the effect of measurement errors on racial 
disparities in lending depend on (1) whether the distribution of credit quality is 
homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to race, and (2) whether or not the errors are 
correlated with race. Assume measurement errors are uncorrelated with race and the 
distribution of credit quality is homogeneous with respect to race.52 The measurement 
errors should have the same impact on minority and nonminority borrowers. 
52 Ferguson and Peters (1997) assume that a correlation between underwriting errors and 
race implies that errors are made over a wider range of 8's for minority borrowers than 
for nonminority borrowers. They assume the underwriting errors are symmetrical. 
Therefore, if errors are correlated with respect to race, Ferguson and Peters (1997) 
assume Eb = Ew and cr Eb > cr Ew. 
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Now assume the measurement errors are uncorrelated with race, but the 
distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous with respect to race. Ferguson and Peters 
( 1997) show that the measurement errors will have a more adverse impact on minority 
applicants than on nonrninority applicants. That is, more creditworthy minority 
applicants than creditworthy nonrninority applicants will be denied loans. Their analysis 
assumes that the majority of nonrninority applicants and the majority of minority 
- I\ 
applicants meet the minimum requirements for loan approval (i.e. 8 > 8). The result is 
that the marginal credit score is on the upward sloping side of the distribution for both 
nonrninority and minority borrowers (Figure 9). Therefore, if underwriting errors occur 
in a random manner (and are symmetrical as Ferguson and Peters assume), the errors will 
result in a higher proportion of creditworthy applicants being denied mortgages than the 
proportion ofuncreditworthy applicants that are approved.53 If the distribution of 
minority borrowers is lower than the distribution of nonrninority borrowers (i.e., 
nonrninority borrowers have a higher distribution of credit quality), then minorities will 
be more adversely affected by the underwriting errors than nonrninority borrowers.54 
53 The number of creditworthy minorities denied loans will be greater than the number of 
uncreditworthy minorities granted loans. Assuming p is the proportion of underwriting 
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Next, assume the measurement errors are correlated with race, such that lenders 
make more underwriting errors when reviewing applications from minority borrowers. 
Ferguson and Peters (1997) show that more underwriting errors will increase unwarranted 
racial disparities in lending decisions regardless of the distribution of credit quality if 
underwriting errors are symmetric and the majority of all loan applications are 
approved. 55 
The next three sections expand the Ferguson and Peters (1997) analysis with 
examples. The first section shows the impact of using an owner wealth maximizing 
lending model when the distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous. The second 
section shows the impact of using a variable in the model that is a-poor proxy for true 
creditworthiness if (1) the variable is uncorrelated with race, or (2) the variable is 
positively correlated with race and believed to be negatively correlated with 
creditworthiness. The third section shows the impact of using an equal outcome model 
to make lending decisions if the actual distribution of credif quality is heterogeneous. An 
equal outcome model is a subset of an original model constructed to assure equal 
outcomes in lending decisions. 
a. The Impact of Using an Owner Wealth Maximizing Model 
Assume the probability of repayment, 8, is determined by factors A, B, and C that 
are unobservable to the lender (8 = f(A, B, C)), where A and B are uncorrelated with race 
55 The assumption that the majority of all loans are approved implies that the cutoff point 
for marginal loans is on the upward sloping side of the distribution. If errors are 
symmetric, this means there will be more good loans rejected than bad loans approved. 
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and C is correlated with race. The distribution of e will be heterogeneous since factor C 
is correlated with race. Assume the lender's calculation of the probability of repayment, 
ec, is determined by factors W, X, and Y (Sc= f(W, X, Y)), where W, X, and Y are the 
best available proxies for factors A, B, and C. The calculation of ec will contain noise, 
but the noise is minimized by using the best proxies available. Assuming W and X are 
uncorrelated with race and Y's correlation with race is approximately equal to C's 
correlation with race, the distribution of ec will be approximately equal to the distribution 
of 8.56 In this case, approving all loans with calculated credit quality above 8* will be 
consistent with maximizing owner wealth because ec is approximately equal to 8 across 
the borrowing population. .Assuming the majority of all loan applications are approved 
and credit quality is heterogeneous, any noise will have a disproportionate impact on 
minority borrowers. 57 
b. The Impact of Using Poor Proxies for Creditworthiness 
Now assume the calculation of ec includes variable Zin addition to variables W, 
X, and Y (8c = f(W, X, Y, Z)), where variable Z is not a good proxy for any of the factors, 
A, B, and C.58 Since variable Z is used in the determination of 8c and is not a good proxy 
for any of the determinants of e, including variable Z increases the noise in 8c. Including 
56 The only way the distributions would be equal is if variables W, X, and Y were perfect 
proxies for factors A, B, and C. 
57This is based on the assumptions in the previous section that (1) credit quality is 
heterogeneous, and (2) the majority of all loan applications are approved. 
58 This does not assume that lenders know Z is not a good proxy. Lenders may believe Z 
is a good proxy and use it in underwriting loans when, in fact, it is a very poor proxy. 
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variable Z results in a faulty credit decision model that either approves some loans that 
should be rejected, rejects some loans that should be approved, or both. Even if Z is 
uncorrelated with race, the noise in Sc will have a more detrimental impact on minority 
borrowers than on nonminority borrowers if credit quality is heterogeneous. This is not 
considered discrimination because the errors caused by including variable Z should be 
identically distributed for marginal nonminority and minority borrowers (since Z is 
uncorrelated with race). If Z is correlated with race such that Sc is systematically lower 
than S for minority borrowers and Sc is systematically higher than S for nonminority 
borrowers, the result is statistical discrimination. In this case, the errors that result from 
including variable Z tend to µnderstate the credit quality of minority borrowers and 
overstate the credit quality of nonminority borrowers. This is shown in Figure 10. The 
amount of the understatement of S for minority borrowers is Eb (Sc= S - Eb), and the 
amount of the overstatement of S for nonminority borrowers is Ew (Sc= S + Ew)- The 
credit decision model approves all loans where S c > Sc*. 59 Marginal borrowers will have 
8c = 8c *. Therefore, the true credit quality of marginal minority borrowers will be 8c * + 
Eb and the true credit quality of marginal nonminority borrowers will be 8c * - Ew. The 
marginal nonminority borrower will have credit quality Eb + Ew lower than the marginal 
59 Ferguson and Peters (1995 and 1997) assume the marginal cutoff point is known. An 
example of the cutoff point could be all loans that meet the minimum underwriting 
guidelines for sale in the secondary market are approved and all others are rejected. Note 
that the underwriting guidelines do not measure true creditworthiness. They use proxies 
to measure creditworthiness. Therefore, the marginal cutoff point used by lenders reflects 
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minority borrower. Therefore, discriminatory lending occurs due to the use of variable Z 
in the credit decision model. This is statistical discrimination. This illustrates the 
importance of selecting variables to be included in a lending model carefully, because 
errors in variable selection may increase unwarranted racial disparities in lending. If the 
variables used are correlated with race and are poor proxies of creditworthiness, statistical 
discrimination will occur. 
c. The Impact of Using an Equal Outcome Model 
If Sc is heterogeneous, we expect to see differences in loan denial and default rates 
for nonminority and minority borrowers. One way to eliminate the racial disparity in 
loan denials is to use a credit decision model that will produce a distribution of Sc's that is 
homogeneous.60 Let the true probability ofrepayment, 8, be determined by factors A, B, 
and C as before. Factors A and Bare uncorrelated with race and factor C is correlated 
with race. Let Sc be determined by variables W and X, which are the best available 
proxies for factors A and B. Assuming variables Wand X are uncorrelated with race, the 
distribution of ec will be homogeneous, but the distribution of 8 remains heterogeneous. 
There will be an increase in the noise in Sc using this model in place of the owner wealth 
maximizing model. 
Assume the correlation of factor C to race is such that minority borrowers tend to 
have higher values of factor C and higher values of factor C are associated with lower 
60 This should eliminate racial disparities in loan denials. Any model that reduces the 
magnitude of heterogeneity will reduce racial disparities in loan denials. 
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probabilities of repayment. The omission of variables to proxy factor C will result in a 
tendency to overstate the probability of repayment for minority borrowers and understate 
the probability of repayment for nonminority borrowers. Assume omitting variables that 
proxy factor C systematically overstates 8 for minority borrowers by Eb (Sc= 8 + Eb) and 
systematically understates 8 for nonminority borrowers by Ew (Sc = 8 - Ew). This is shown 
in Figure 11. Marginal borrowers will have ec = 8*. The true credit quality of marginal 
minority borrowers will be 8* - Eb and the true credit quality of marginal nonminority 
borrowers will be 8* + Ew. Marginal nonminority borrowers will have credit quality Eb+ 
Ew higher than marginal minority borrowers. Average credit quality for minority 
A 
borrowers, SH, will be significantly less than the average credit quality for nonminority 
A 
borrowers, So. The equal outcome model will achieve equal loan approval rates for 
nonminority and minority borrowers, but default rates should be significantly higher for 
minority borrowers. 
There is more noise in the estimation of 8 using the equal outcome model than 
using the owner wealth maximizing model, because the equal outcome model suffers 
from an omitted variable bias. Ferguson and Peters (1997) show that increasing the noise 
increases the variability in the measurement error. Given some true probability of 
repayment, 8', the owner wealth maximizing model will calculate the probability of 
repayment, 8\, to be 8' + Ei, while the equal outcome model will calculate 8'c to be 8' + 








model, there should be less dispersion in the measurement errors using the owner wealth 
maximizing model than using the equal outcome model ( 0"6 < a e ). This is shown in 
I 2 
Figure 12. Since there is less dispersion in the owner wealth maximizing model in 
estimating 8, the owner wealth maximizing model should outperform the equal outcome 
model in predicting loan defaults. 
D. Theoretical Hypotheses 
1. Introduction 
The recent focus of policymakers on eliminating racial disparities in lending 
decisions leads to the question of what the costs and benefits of such actions would be. 
In order to eliminate racial disparities in lending decisions, it is necessary to eliminate the 
heterogeneity in credit decision models. If the true distribution of credit quality is 
homogeneous, equal outcome lending will have no cost. However, if the true distribution 
of credit quality is heterogeneous, the cost of equal outcome lending will be any loss in 
the ability of the equal outcome model to predict loan defaults compared to the owner 
wealth maximizing model. 
Measuring the costs and benefits of using an equal outcome model instead of an 
owner wealth maximizing model is the focus of the second and third hypotheses. The 
benefit of using an equal outcome model is any reduction in the racial disparity in lending 
decisions from using the equal outcome model instead of the owner wealth maximizing 
model. This is tested in hypothesis two. The cost of using the equal outcome model is 
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any reduction in default prediction from using the equal outcome model instead of the 
owner wealth maximizing model. The third hypothesis involves measuring this cost. 
2. Hypothesis I: The Distribution of Credit Quality 
An important consideration when investigating racial disparities in lending is 
whether the distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous or homogeneous with respect 
to race. Ferguson and Peters (1995) suggest that homogeneous distributions of the 
probability ofrepayment should result in equal denial and default rates for nonminority 
and minority borrowers in the absence of discrimination. This assumes the probability of 
repayment, 8, is measured without noise. It will also be true if any noise in estimating 8 
is symmetrical and uncorrelated with race. If the distribution of credit quality is 
heterogeneous, the relationship between denial rates, default rates and discrimination 
becomes more complex as shown in Ferguson and Peters (1997) and earlier in this 
research. 
Previous empirical evidence indicates different denial and default rates occur for 
nonminority and minority applicants. These results are consistent with heterogeneous 
distributions of the probability of repayment, but do not rule out the existence of 
discrimination. Before conducting an analysis of whether or not discrimination exists in 
the market for residential mortgage loans, it is important to establish whether the 
distribution of e is homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to race. A finding of 
homogeneous distributions would indicate that the owner wealth maximizing model and 
the equal outcome model should be identical and that performance-based measures used 
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by policymakers to determine if lenders discriminate will be effective. A finding of 
heterogeneous distributions indicates that the equal outcome model will not contain all of 
the same variables as the owner wealth maximizing model and that equal outcome 
lending encouraged by the performance-based measures will probably have a cost. The 
expectation is that the distributions of the probability of repayment for nonminority and 
minority borrowers are heterogeneous: 
H0 : Minority borrowers are, on average, at least as creditworthy as nonminority 
borrowers. 
HA: Minority borrowers are, on average, less creditworthy than nonminority 
borrowers. 
3. Hypothesis II: Racial Disparities in Lending Decisions 
Empirical evidence indicates that minority applicants have higher denial rates than 
nonminority applicants. This may be due to heterogeneous credit quality, discrimination, 
or both. Differences in loan approval rates for nonminority and minority applicants will 
depend on the variables used to make the loan decision. As discussed earlier, one way to 
try to reduce or eliminate racial disparities in loan approvals is to use an equal outcome 
model to make loan decisions. An equal outcome model should result in less racial 
disparity in loan approvals than an owner wealth maximizing model: 
H0: The equal outcome model results in at least as much racial disparity in 
loan approvals as the owner wealth maximizing model. 
HA: The equal outcome model results in less racial disparity in loan 
approvals than the owner wealth maximizing model. 
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4. Hypothesis III: Default Prediction 
The use of an equal outcome model may reduce racial disparities in lending but it 
will also increase the noise in the estimation of the probability of repayment, 8. Due to 
the increased noise, the measurement errors will be greater for the equal outcome model 
than for the owner wealth maximizing model. Since the equal outcome model is 
expected to give less accurate estimates of the probability of repayment, it should not 
perform as well in predicting loan defaults as the owner wealth maximizing model: 
H0 : The equal outcome model predicts loan defaults at least as well as 
the owner wealth maximizing model. 
HA: The owner wealth maximizing model predicts loan defaults with more 
accuracy than the equal outcome model. 
E. Conclusion 
This chapter has developed a theoretical credit decision model that incorporates 
the borrower's default decision. The theoretical model is based on the premise that 
lenders make decisions that maximize shareholder wealth. The owner wealth maximizing 
model should minimize noise in calculating the probability of repayment. If variables in 
the owner wealth maximizing model are correlated with race, the distribution of the 
calculated probability ofrepayment, Sc, will be heterogeneous. The first hypothesis 
involves testing the owner wealth maximizing model to determine if the borrowing 
population is heterogeneous. 
The recent focus of policymakers on eliminating racial disparities in lending 
decisions leads to the question of what the costs and benefits of such actions would be. 
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In order to eliminate racial disparities in lending decisions, it is necessary to eliminate the 
heterogeneity in credit decision models. If the true distribution of credit quality is 
homogeneous, equal outcome lending will have no cost. However, if the true distribution 
of credit quality is heterogeneous, the cost of equal outcome lending will be any loss in 
the ability of the equal outcome model to predict loan defaults compared to the owner 
wealth maximizing model. 
Measuring the costs and benefits of using an equal outcome model instead of an 
owner wealth maximizing model is the focus of the second and third hypotheses. The 
benefit of using an equal outcome model is any reduction in the racial disparity in lending 
decisions from using the equal outcome model instead of the owner wealth maximizing 
model. This is tested in hypothesis two. The cost of using the equal outcome model is 
any reduction in default prediction from using the equal outcome model instead of the 
owner wealth maximizing model. The third hypothesis involves measuring this cost. 





In their efforts to end discrimination in the mortgage market, policymakers in 
Washington have shifted the focus from evaluating lenders' efforts to lend to minorities 
to evaluating their performance in lending to minorities. Some industry experts caution 
that this type of assessment will lead to lending quotas or equal outcome lending, 
regardless of qualifications (England (1993)). 
Equal outcome lending will accomplish the social goal of eliminating racial 
disparities in lending. The cost of this type of lending program to society depends on 
whether the racial disparities that exist are due primarily to discrimination or whether 
they occur because white applicants tend to be more creditworthy than minority 
applicants. The three hypotheses developed in the previous chapter address these issues. 
The first hypothesis involves testing whether the distribution of credit quality is 
homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to race. If the distribution of credit quality is 
homogeneous, the empirical owner wealth maximizing model developed in this chapter 
will produce equal loan approval rates across racial groups. If credit quality is 
heterogeneous with respect to race, the owner wealth maximizing model will produce 
racial disparities in loan approval rates. An equal outcome model is derived by testing all 
possible subsets of the empirical owner wealth maximizing model to determine which set 
of variables will produce equal loan approval rates for white and black borrowers. If the 
distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous with respect to race, the equal outcome 
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model will not include all of the same variables that are in the owner wealth maximizing 
model. 
The second hypothesis tests to determine if racial disparities in loan approvals 
produced by the equal outcome model are significantly less than the racial disparities 
produced by the owner wealth maximizing model. If the distribution of credit quality is 
found to be heterogeneous, the equal outcome model should result in significantly less 
racial disparity in loan approval rates than the owner wealth maximizing model. This 
hypothesis is tested using loan application data. 
The third hypothesis tests the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal 
outcome model to determine if the owner wealth maximizing model is significantly better 
than the equal outcome model in predicting loan defaults. If the distribution of credit 
quality is heterogeneous with respect to race, the owner wealth maximizing model should 
significantly outperform the equal outcome model in loan default prediction. This 
hypothesis is tested using loan default data. This chapter describes the two datasets used 
in the empirical analysis, discusses the development of the empirical owner wealth 
maximizing model and equal outcome model, and outlines the statistical methodology 
used to test the hypotheses. 
B. Data 
One unique aspect of this research is the use of separate datasets to measure ( 1) 
racial disparity in lending decisions and (2) default prediction. The loan application data 
is important in measuring the racial disparity in lending decisions that will be produced 
by the owner wealth maximizing empirical model and the equal outcome model. The loan 
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default data is important in testing each model's ability to predict loan defaults. 
1. Loan Application Data 
The loan application data used in this research is a partial dataset from Munnell, 
Tootell, Browne and McEneaney (1996), which contains information on loan applications 
taken by Boston area lenders in 1990. The dataset was released by the Boston Federal 
Reserve and includes most of the variables used by Munnell et. al. (1996), but does not 
include variables relating to the lender or the characteristics of the census tract. The loan 
application data is augmented with 1990 Census data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
Coding errors in the Munnell et. al. (1996) dataset have been detailed by Home 
(1994), Liebowitz (1993), and Carr and Megbolugbe (1993). Carr and Megbolugbe 
(1993) subjected the Munnell et. al. (1996) dataset to several filters to "clean" the dataset. 
A similar process was performed on the data for this research. Observations that failed 
any of the following criteria were deleted from the sample: 
Criterion # 1 : The purchase price must not exceed $10 million. 
Criterion #2: Liquid assets must not exceed $10 million. 
Criterion #3: The loan-to-value ratio must not exceed· 1.2. 
Criterion #4: The loan term must be between 120 and 500 months. 
Criterion #5: The expense-to-income ratio must be less than the total 
obligations-to income ratio. 
The initial sample consisted of2,932 loan applications, 2,247 from white applicants, 471 
from black applicants, and 214 from Hispanic (or other) applicants. The "cleaning" 
procedure reduced the initial sample of2,932 loan applications to 2,447 loan applications, 
1,914 from white applicants, 376 from black applicants, and 157 from Hispanic (or other) 
applicants. This research develops a model for fixed-rate single-family owner occupied 
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mortgage loans. Only loans that meet these criteria are included in the final sample. All 
variable rate loans, loans secured by 2-4 residences, and loans secured by residences that 
are not owner-occupied are deleted from the final sample. Hispanic applicants are 
deleted from the dataset to make the loan application dataset consistent with the loan 
default dataset, which contains no Hispanic borrowers. The final. sample consists of 
1,255 loan applications, 1,096 from white applicants, 159 from black applicants. The 
final sample consists of 1,159 approved loans and 96 denied loans. 
2. Loan Default Data 
The loan default data used in this research consists of borrower, loan and property 
characteristics on FHA-insured single-family residential mortgage loans originated from 
1986 through 1989. The data was recently made available by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The dataset includes information on each 
FHA-insured loan from origination to the disposition of the loan, and indicates if the loan 
defaulted. The original dataset contains 104 variables and more than three million 
observations. The loan default data is augmented with 1990 Census data from the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census. The empirical tests of this research uses seven empirical variables 
derived from the theoretical model and a stratified random sample of 5,000 observations. 
The sample is stratified to assure an equal number of defaulted and non-defaulted loans in 
the sample. 
Several restrictions are placed on the data used in the empirical tests. The sample 
data includes only those observations where the property is owner-occupied and the loan 
has a fixed-rate until maturity. All observations with missing values for any of the 
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empirical variables are also excluded from the sample. The final sam,ple of 5,000 
observations includes 2,500 loans that defaulted and 2,500 loans that did not default. 
There are 4,000 white borrowers and 1,000 black borrowers in the sample, with forty-six 
states represented in the sample. 
C. Empirical Models 
1. Owner Wealth Maximizing Model 
Implementation of the theoretical model requires translation of the theoretical 
variables into empirical variables. The proxy variables should be variables that can be 
observed by the lender at the time of the credit decision. The theoretical variables that 
must be estimated with available data are (1) the current market value of the residence, 
Vt, (2) the costs associated with selling the residence, C, (3) the outstanding loan balance, 
Lt, (4) the value the borrower places on having a default-free credit rating, REP, (5) the 
monthly cost of renting a comparable dwelling, RENT, (6) the borrower's cost of 
nonhousing capital, r*, (7) the financial resources of the borrower, FINRES, (8) the 
probability of a crisis event, P(CRISIS), and (9) the amount of the expected loss if default 
occurs, EXPLOSS: 
P(APPROVE) = f(~,L1 ,C,REP,HE,RENT,r*,FINRES,P(CRISIS),EXPLOSS) (15) 
a. The Value of the Residence, Vt, and the Outstanding Loan Balance, Lt 
The importance of the value of the residence and the outstanding loan balance is 
that they measure home equity. Therefore, these two variables should be measured 
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relative to each other. The value of the residence is measured as the lower of the 
appraised value or the purchase price which is a more conservative approach than has 
been used in previous research. Previous research uses the appraised value to measure 
the value of the residence, without regard for the purchase price of the property. At loan 
origination, the outstanding loan balance is the loan amount. In this research, the variable 
used to proxy the relationship between the value of the residence and the outstanding loan 




MIN(APPRAISED VALUE, PURCHASE PRICE) 
(16) 
Holding other factors constant, increases in the loan amount relative to the value of the 
residence will increase the probability of default and decrease the probability that the loan 
will be approved. 
b. Costs Associated With the Sale of the Residence, C 
The empirical model does not include proxies for the costs associated with the 
sale of the residence. The costs associated with selling the residence are expected to be 
proportional to the value of the residence. However, including the appraised value as an 
additional explanatory variable is not necessary since it would be collinear with the loan-
to-value ratio. The real impact of these costs is whether or not they make net equity 
negative. If the loan-to-value ratio is sufficiently high, selling costs will make net equity 
negative. Selling costs will not make net equity negative if the loan-to-value ratio is low. 
Accurate information on selling costs is not available for the data used in the empirical 
121 
analysis. The omission of this variable may cause the model to have an omitted variable 
bias. 
c. The Value The Borrower Places on Having a Default-Free 
Credit Rating, REP 
The value the borrower places on having a default free credit rating is measured 
with a dummy variable, CREDHIS, which equals 1 if the lender considered the 
applicant's credit history a positive compensating factor in the loan decision and 0 
otherwise. The CREDHIS variable should be negatively related to the probability of 
default and positively related to the probability the loan will be approved. 
For the loan application data, a second dummy variable is employed. The second 
dummy variable, BADCRED, equals 1 if the applicant has any history of loan defaults 
and O otherwise.61 The BADCRED variable should be negatively related to the 
probability of loan approval. 
d. Monthly Cost of Homeownership, HE, and Monthly Rental Costs, 
RENT 
The monthly rental costs for a comparable dwelling should be measured relative 
to the monthly cost of homeownership. The monthly rental cost of a comparable 
dwelling is measured as the average monthly rent in the neighborhood. The monthly 
mortgage payment is used as a proxy for the monthly costs of homeownership. This 
research uses the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average rental rate to 
61 The BADCRED variable is not available for the loan default dataset, therefore it cannot 
be tested to determine if it explains defaults. 
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measure the .relationship between monthly rental costs and the monthly cost of 
homeownership, MTGRENT: 
MTGRENT = __ Mi_ON_TH_'L_Y_Mi_OR_Ti_'G_!,4_G_E_P_'A_Y:_U_E_'NT _ _ 
AVERAGE MONTHLY NEIGHBORHOOD RENT 
(17) 
Higher values of MTG RENT indicate the borrower can obtain alternative and comparable 
housing in the rental market at a much lower cost. The MTGRENT variable should be 
positively related to the probability of default and negatively related to the probability the 
loan will be approved. The monthly cost of homeownership should also include taxes, 
insurance, and maintenance costs, but that information is not available for the data used in 
· the empirical analysis. The omission of the variables from the monthly cost of 
homeownership may result in the model having an omitted variable bias. 
e. The Borrower's Cost of Nonhousing Debt, r* 
The empirical model does not include proxies for the borrower's cost of 
nonhousing debt. The borrower's cost ofnonhousing debt cannot be obtained for the 
individual borrowers in the sample. The omission of this variable may result in the 
model having an omitted variable bias. 
j The Financial Resources of the Borrower, FINRES 
The borrower's financial resources are important for two reasons. First, a 
borrower with strong financial resources may be able to overcome crisis events that 
would usually require a borrower to move from the residence. The ability to overcome 
crisis events will reduce the probability of default. Second, a borrower that places a high 
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value on having a default-free credit rating still must have financial resources to protect 
against default. It is not enough that a borrower doesn't want to default. If a crisis event 
forces the borrower to move when the borrower has substantial negative home equity and 
very low financial resources, default may be the only possible course of action. In the 
same situation, a borrower with high financial resources might be able to sell the house 
and pay off the loan using financial resources to cover the negative equity. Borrowers 
with stronger financial resources should be less likely to default and more likely to have 
their loans approved. 
Two empirical variables are used to measure the financial resources of the 
borrower: (1) the ratio of liquid assets to the mortgage payment, LIQMTG, and (2) the 
ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, RESMTG. Liquid 
assets and residual income are measured relative to the mortgage payment, because 
borrowers with lower mortgage payments are likely to be able to keep the loan current 
with lower levels of residual income and liquid assets. Higher ratios ofLIQMTG and 
RESMTG should increase the probability of loan approval and decrease the probability of 
loan default. 
g. The Probability of a Crisis Event, P(CRISIS) 
Anything that increases the probability of a crisis event will increase the 
probability of default and decrease the probability that the loan will be approved. Crisis 
events are defined as any events that make it impossible for the borrower to continue 
living in the residence, e.g., loss of employment, significant reduction in income, and 
divorce. One empirical variable is used to proxy the probability of a crisis event. The 
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variable is a measure of the job stability of the borrower. The empirical variable, 
EMPLOY, equals 1 if the lender considered the applicant's employment history a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise. This variable should be 
positively related to the probability of loan approval and negatively related to the 
probability of loan default. 
h. The Expected Loss From Default, EXP LOSS 
If the borrower defaults on the loan, the lender may be exposed to a loss. The 
amount of loss exposure depends on the value of the collateral which is impacted by 
demand and supply factors for comparable dwellings in the neighborhood. The demand 
and supply of comparable dwellings in the neighborhood will be measured by the 
vacancy rate in the neighborhood. A dummy variable, VACANT, which equals 1 if the 
neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds five percent and O otherwise is used. The five 
percent threshold is used because vacancy rates of five percent or less are considered 
normal neighborhood vacancy rates. The dataset released by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) includes this dummy variable. Vacancy rates higher 
than five percent may be indicative of declining property values due to declining demand 
for housing in the neighborhood. 
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i. The Final Model 
The empirical model developed from the theoretical model is shown: 
where LTV is the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or the 
appraised value, CREDHIS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant's credit 
history was a positive compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
BADCRED is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower has a history of loan 
defaults and O otherwise, MTG RENT is the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the 
average monthly rental rate for the neighborhood, LIQMTG is the ratio of the borrower's 
liquid assets to the mortgage payment, RESMTG is the ratio of the applicant's residual 
income to the mortgage payment, EMPLOY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
borrower's employment history was a positive compensating factor in the loan decision 
and O otherwise, and VA CANT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the neighborhood 
vacancy rate exceeds five percent and O otherwise.62 
2. Equal Outcome Model 
The empirical equal outcome model is derived by testing all possible subsets of 
the empirical owner wealth maximizing model to determine which set of variables will 
produce equal average probabilities of loan approval for white and black applicants. This 
62 The empirical model used to test the loan default dataset does not include the 
BADCRED variable. 
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is achieved by comparing the average probability of loan approval for white and black 
applicants for all 127 possible subsets of the owner wealth maximizing model. The 
model that produces the closest average probability of loan approval for white and black 
applicants is the equal outcome model. The model is shown: 
P(AP PROVE) = b0 + b1RESMI'G + b2MI'GRENT + b3EMP LOY+ e (19) 
The actual loan approval rates and the average probabilities of loan approval for 
white and black applicants using the two empirical models are shown in Table I. The 
average probability of loan approval for white and black applicants are approximately 
equal using the equal outcome model. 
D. Descriptive Statistics on the Data 
1. Loan Application Data 
Descriptive statistics on the final sample of loan applications are shown in Table 
II. White applicants, on average, have significantly lower loan to value ratios (p-value < 
.0001) and significantly higher liquid asset to mortgage payment ratios than black 
applicants (p-value < .0001). The average loan to value ratio is 79.8 percent for white 
applicants compared to 86.5 percent for black applicants. White applicants in the sample 
are also more likely to have strong credit histories (p-value < .0001) and stable 
employment histories (p-value < .0001) than black applicants. The applicant's credit 
history is considered a positive compensating factor for 18.9 percent of white applicants 
and only 6.3 percent of black applicants. Employment history is a positive compensating 
factor for 31.1 percent of white applicants and 18 .2 percent of black applicants. 
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TABLE I 
A VERA GE PROBABILITIES OF LOAN APPROVAL FOR 
WHITE AND BLACK APPLICANTS 
White Applicants Black Applicants 
Actual Results: Approved Loans 93.80% 82.39% 
Owner Wealth Maximizing Model 92.96% 88.17% 
Equal Outcome Model 92.35% 92.36% 
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TABLE II 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE LOAN APPLICATION DATASET 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
All applicants (n=1255) 
Loan to value ratio .806 .119 .500 1.188 
Credit history is positive factor .173 .378 .000 1.000 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .124 .330 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent .718 .578 .043 5.900 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 49.022 85.114 .000 1201.330 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 3.047 1.848 .113 22.345 
Employment is positive factor .295 .456 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .306 .461 .000 1.000 
White applicants (n= 1096) 
Loan to value ratio .798 .120 .500 1.188 
Credit history is positive factor .189 .392 .000 1.000 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .105 .307 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent .726 .599 .043 5.900 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 52.087 89.935 .000 1201.330 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 3.096 1.885 .113 22.345 
Employment is positive factor .311 .463 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .281 .450 .000 1.000 
Black applicants (n=159) 
Loan to value ratio .865 .088 .521 1.071 
Credit history is positive factor .063 .244 .000 1.000 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .258 .439 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent .663 .403 .141 2.866 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 27.898 30.444 .000 195.666 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.709 1.534 .548 17.642 
Employment is positive factor .182 .387 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy rate> 5% .478 .501 .000 1.000 
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TABLE II ( continued) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE LOAN APPLICATION DATASET 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Approved Applicants n=l 159) 
Loan to value ratio .803 .120 .500 1.188 
Credit history is positive factor .183 .387 .000 1.000 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .107 .309 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent .711 .567 .043 5.900 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 50.343 87.920 .000 1201.330 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 3.053 1.853 .113 22.345 
Employment is positive factor .296 .457 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .297 .457 .000 1.000 
Rejected Applicants (n=96) 
Loan to value ratio .844 .093 .602 1.094 
Credit history is positive factor .052 .223 .000 1.000 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .333 .474 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent .800 - .696 .164 4.704 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 33.079 33.513 .000 233.302 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.974 1.787 .834 12.160 
Employment is positive factor .281 .452 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .417 .496 .000 1.000 
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TABLE II ( continued) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE LOAN APPLICATION DATASET 
Tests for Difference in Population Means for White Vs. Black Applicants 
White Black 
Variable Applicants Applicants t-Statistic p-Value 
Loan to value ratio .798 .865 - 8.52 <.0001 
Credit history is positive factor .189 .063 5.55 <.0001 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .105 .258 - 4.25 <.0001 
Mortgage payment to average rent .726 .663 1.72 .0854 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 52.087 27.898 6.66 <.0001 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 3.096 2.709 2.88 .0040 
Employment is positive factor .311 .182 3.82 <.0001 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .281 .478 - 4.69 <.0001 
Tests for Difference in Population Means for Approved Vs. Rejected Applicants 
Approved Rejected 
Variable Applicants Applicants t-Statistic p-Value 
Loan to value ratio .803 .844 -4.05 <.0001 
Credit history is positive factor .183 .052 5.15 <.0001 
Previous loan default (BADCRED) .107 .333 - 4.59 <.0001 
Mortgage payment to average rent .711 .800 - 1.22 .2224 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 50.343 33.079 4.03 <.0001 
Residual income to mortgage 
Payment 3.053 2.974 .42 .6744 
Employment is positive factor .296 .204 .31 .7566 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .297 .417 - 2.29 .0220 
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Rejected applicants, on average, have significantly higher loan to value ratios and 
lower liquid asset to mortgage payment ratios than approved applicants. The average 
loan to value ratio is 80.3 percent for approved applicants compared to 84.4 percent for 
rejected applicants. Rejected applicants also have significantly worse credit histories than 
approved applicants (p-value < .0001). Approximately 18 percent of approved applicants 
have strong credit histories compared to only 5.2 percent ofrejected applicants. One-
third of rejected applicants have a history of loan defaults (BADCRED), and 10. 7 percent 
of approved applicants have defaulted on loans (p-value < .0001). Previous research 
finds the applicant's credit history and liquid assets play an important role in loan 
approvals (Munnell et. al. (1996)). Previous default research finds that borrowers with 
higher loan to value ratios are more likely to default. 
2. Loan Default Data 
Descriptive statistics on the loan default dataset are shown in Table III. White 
borrowers, on average, have significantly lower loan to value ratios (p-value < .0001) and 
significantly higher liquid asset to mortgage payment ratios (p-value < .0001) than black 
borrowers. The average loan to value ratio is 100.2 percent for white borrowers 
compared to 101.2 percent for black borrowers. White borrowers in the sample are also 
more likely to have strong credit histories (p-value < .0001) and stable employment 
histories (p-value < .0001) than black borrowers. The borrower's credit history is 
considered a positive compensating factor for 22.8 percent of white borrowers and only 
10.0 percent of black borrowers. Employment history is a positive compensating factor 
for 22.5 percent of white borrowers and 13.5 percent of black borrowers. 
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TABLE III 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE LOAN DEFAULT DATASET 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
All Borrowers (n=5000) 
Loan to value ratio 1.004 .054 .340 1.490 
Credit history is positive factor .202 .402 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent 1.622 .543 .438 4.855 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 9.652 11.261 .000 98.170 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.899 1.392 .050 13.870 
Employment is positive factor .207 .405 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .622 .485 .000 1.000 
White borrowers (n=4000) 
Loan to value ratio 1.002 .055 .340 1.480 
Credit history is positive factor .228 .419 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent 1.642 .543 .438 4.660 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 10.231 11.603 .000 98.170 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.878 1.394 ;050 13.870 
Employment is positive factor .225 .418 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy > 5% .617 .486 .000 1.000 
Black borrowers (n=lOOO) 
Loan to value ratio 1.012 .052 .670 1.490 
Credit history is positive factor .100 .300 .000 1.000 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 7.338 9.430 .000 90.890 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.981 1.379 .830 12.480 
Employment is positive factor .135 .342 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .640 .480 .000 1.000 
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TABLE III ( continued) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE LOAN DEFAULT DATASET 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Non-Defaulted Borrowers (n=2500) 
Loan to value ratio .998 .062 .340 1.490 
Credit history is positive factor .397 . .489 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent 1.674 .555 .508 4.855 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 11.556 12.181 .000 98.170 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.864 1.426 .050 13.870 
Employment is positive factor .397 .489 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy > 5% .599 .490 .000 1.000 
Defaulted Borrowers (n=2500) 
Loan to value ratio 1.011 .044 .590 1.490 
Credit history is positive factor .008 .087 .000 1.000 
Mortgage payment to average rent 1.570 .525 .438 4.724 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 7.749 9.902 .000 97.640 
Residual income to mortgage 
Payment 2.934 1.356 .330 12.830 
Employment is positive factor .. 018 .132 .000 1.000 
Neighborhood vacancy > 5% .644 .479 .000 1.000 
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TABLE III ( continued) 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE LOAN DEFAULT DATASET 
Tests for Difference in Population Means for White Vs. Black Borrowers 
White Black 
Variable Borrowers Borrowers t-Statistic p-Value 
Loan to value ratio 1.002 1.012 - 5.38 <.0001 
Credit history is positive factor .228 .100 11.06 <.0001 
Mortgage payment to average rent 1.642 1.542 5.28 <.0001 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 10.231 7.338 8.26 <.0001 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.878 2.981 - 2.11 .0348 
Employment is positive factor .225 .135 7.10 <.0001 
Neighborhood vacancy> 5% .617 .640 - 1.35 .1770 
Tests for Difference in Population Means for Non-Defaulted Vs. Defaulted Borrowers 
Non-Defaulted Defaulted 
Variable Borrowers Borrowers t-Statistic p-Value 
Loan to value ratio .998 1.011 - 8.55 <.0001 
Credit history is positive factor .397 .008 39.16 <.0001 
Mortgage payment to average rent 1.674 1.570 6.81 <.0001 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 11.556 7.749 12.13 <.0001 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 2.864 2.934 - 1.78 .0750 
Employment is positive factor .397 .018 37.41 <.0001 
Neighborhood vacancy > 5% .599 .644 - 3.28 .0010 
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Defaulted borrowers, on average, have significantly higher loan to value ratios 
and lower liquid asset to mortgage payment ratios than borrowers that did not default. 
The average loan to value ratio is 101.1 percent for defaulted borrowers compared to 99.8 
percent for borrowers that did not default. Borrowers that defaulted were less likely to 
have their previous credit history used as a positive compensating factor in the loan 
approval decision than borrowers that did not default. Only 0.8 percent of defaulted 
borrowers had credit histories that were considered positive compensating factors when 
the loan was originated. Almost 40 percent of borrowers that did not default had credit 
histories that were considered positive compensating factors when the loan was 
originated. There is also a significant difference in the employment history variable for 
defaulted and non-defaulted borrowers. Employment history was a positive 
compensating factor for only 1.8 percent of defaulted borrowers compared to 39.7 percent 
of borrowers that did not default. Previous research finds high loan to value ratios are 
positively related to loan defaults. 
E. Statistical Methodology 
1. Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis one uses the owner wealth maximizing model and the loan default 
dataset to test whether the borrowing population is homogeneous or heterogeneous with 
respect to race. The following logit regression model is used on the loan default data to 




Pi= PROB6'i = 1 I xi), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan defaulted and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or appraised value, 
(2) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant's credit history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
(3) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(4) the ratio of the borrower's liquid assets to the mortgage payment, 
(5) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, 
(6) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, and 
(7) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds 5 percent 
and O otherwise. 
The probability of default, Pi, for each observation, is used as the dependent 
variable in an ordinary least squares regression model to determine if the borrower's race 
is a significant explanatory factor on the probability of default. The OLS regression 
model is shown: 
P(DEFAULT) = b0 + b1RACE + e (21) 
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where P(DEF AULT) for each observation is equal to Pi from equation (20) and RACE 
equals 1 if the borrower is black and zero if the borrower is white. 
If the coefficient on RACE is positive and significant, the average credit quality of 
black borrowers is less than the average credit quality of white borrowers. This would be 
evidence in support of the alternative hypothesis that the distribution of credit quality is 
heterogeneous with respect to race. The following empirical hypothesis is used to test 
whether the borrowing population is homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to race: 
2. Hypothesis Two 
H0 : b1 ~O, 
HA: b1 > 0. 
Hypothesis two tests the effectiveness of the equal outcome model in reducing 
racial disparities in lending decisions. This hypothesis is tested using the loan application 
data. A lo git regression model is used to calculate the probability of loan approval, Pi, 
for each loan application using the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal 




Pi= PROB(vi = 1 I Xi), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan was approved and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
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(1) the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or appraised value, 
(2) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant's credit history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
(3) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower had a history ofloan defaults and 0 
otherwise, 
(4) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(5) the ratio of the borrower's liquid assets to the mortgage payment, 
(6) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, 
(7) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, and 
(8) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds 5 percent 
and O otherwise. 
The logit model specification for the equal outcome model is: 
lo~l~Pi) =b, +b;x; +e, 
where, 
Pi= PROB(Yi = 1 I Xi), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan was approved and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(23) 
(1) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
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(2) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, and 
(3) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise. 
The probability of loan approval, Pi, is calculated for each observation and used 
as the dependent variable in an ordinary least squares regression model to determine if the 
applicant's race is a significant explanatory factor on the probability of loan approval. 
Two separate regressions are used; one using the probability of loan approval, Pi, for 
each observation calculated using the owner wealth maximizing model and the other 
using the probability ofloan approval, Pi, for each observation calculated using the equal 
outcome model. The OLS regression models are shown: 
P(APPROVE) =b0 +b1RACE+e, and 
P(APPROVE) = b; +b; RACE+ e·, 
(24) 
where P(APPROVE) for each observation is equal to Pi from equation 22 for the owner 
wealth maximizing model and from equation 23 for the equal outcome model, 
b0 , b1, and e are the intercept, coefficent on RACE, and error term, respectively, from the 
owner wealth maximizing model, and b;, b;, and e • are the intercept, coefficient on 
RACE, and error term, respectively, from the equal outcome model. 
If minority borrowers have, on average, lower predicted probabilities of loan 
approval, the coefficient on RACE will be significant and negative. If the equal outcome 
model reduces the racial disparity in lending decisions, the coefficient on RACE should 
be greater (less negative) for the equal outcome model than for the owner wealth 
maximizing model. The empirical hypothesis is shown: 
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H0 : b/ ~ b1, 
HA: b/ > bl. 
The parameter estimates b1 • and b1 and their variances are used to calculate at-statistic to 
test for differences in the value of b/ and b1 (Levin and Rubin (1998)): 
(25) 
where b1• is the coefficient on RACE for the equal outcome model, b1 is the coefficient on 
RACE for the owner wealth maximizing model, and the pooled standard error is: 
Sh• I = I -:,I 
where s;1• is the variance for b1 * and s;1 is the variance for b1• 
(26) 
A positive and significant t-statistic indicates the equal outcome model results in 
less racial disparity in lending decisions than the owner wealth maximizing model. 
Therefore, if the t-statistic is positive and significant, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis. 
3. Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis three tests for differences in default prediction performance between 
the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal outcome model. This hypothesis is 
tested using the loan default dataset. A logit regression model is used to calculate the 
probability of default for each loan using the owner wealth maximizing model and the 





P; = PROB(y; = 1 Ix;), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan defaulted and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or appraised value, 
(2) a dummy variable that equals I if the applicant's credit history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
(3) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(4) the ratio of the borrower's liquid assets to the mortgage payment, 
(5) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, 
(6) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, and 
(7) a dummy variable that equals I if the neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds 5 percent 
and O otherwise. 
The logit model specification for the equal outcome model is: 
lo~l~P,) =h, +b,x, +e, (28) 
where, 
Pi = PROB(y; = I I x;), 
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Yi equals 1 if the loan defaulted and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(2) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, and 
(3) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise. 
The probability of default, Pi, for each observation and model are saved and 
recorded. ·The squared differences in the actual value of the dependent variable, 
DEFAULT, and the probability of default, P(DEFAULT), are used as the dependent 
variable in the following ordinary least squares regression model:63 
{DEFAULT-P(DEFAULT)}2 = b0 + b1MODEL + e (29) 
where P(DEFAULT) for each observation is equal to Pi from equation (27) for the owner 
wealth maximizing model and from equation (28) for the equal outcome model, and 
MODEL equals 1 if the probability of default, P(DEFAUL T), is from the owner wealth 
maximizing model and zero if the probability of default is from the equal outcome model. 
If the owner wealth maximizing model reduces the error in measuring the probability of 
default, the coefficient on MODEL should be less than zero. The empirical hypothesis 
used to test hypothesis three is shown: 
Ho: b1::: 0, 
HA: b1 <O. 
63 The prediction errors are squared so that large negative prediction errors and large 
positive prediction errors will not offset each other. 
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4. Determination of the Costs of Using the Equal Outcome Model 
The equal outcome model should provide a benefit in terms of reducing the racial 
disparity in lending decisions. If the distribution of credit quality is heterogeneous with 
respect to race, the cost of using the equal outcome model is that lenders will be less able 
to distinguish good loans from bad loans than if they used the owner wealth maximizing 
model. This is the focus of hypothesis three. In addition to testing hypothesis three as 
described earlier, additional analysis is conducted to determine the costs of using the 
equal outcome model. 
The probability of default, Pi, for each observation and model are used to 
determine if the loan is predicted to default or not default. Observations with a 
probability of default, Pi, greater than .5 are predicted to default, while observations with 
a probability of default less than .5 are predicted not to default.64 The predicted outcomes 
are compared to the actual outcomes. The proportion of loans correctly classified is 
recorded for both empirical models. The following t-test is conducted to determine if the 
owner wealth maximizing model predicts loan defaults more accurately than the equal 
outcome model: 




where PoWMM is the correct prediction rate for the owner wealth maximizing model, PEoM 
64 Aldrich and Nelson (1984) recommend this as one method for testing the goodness of 
fit of the model. Based on the sample proportions of2500 defaulted loans and 2500 non-
defaulted loans, the average probability of default should be .5. This method is presented 
in Gujarati (1995). 
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is the correct prediction rate for the equal outcome model, and 
(31) 
where lloWMM is the sample size used with the owner wealth maximizing model, nEoM is 
the sample size used with the equal outcome model, and 
p = noWMMPowMM + nEoMPEOM 
nOW!vfM + n EOM 
(32) 
Another measure is calculated to determine how much better the owner wealth 
maximizing model is than the equal outcome model in classifying good and bad loans. 
The reduction-in-error index (Klecka (1980), Huberty (1984) and Wilson and Sharda 
(1994) has been used to compare the performance of various models to pure chance 
models. With a slight modification, the reduction-in-error index can be used to compare 
the performance of the owner wealth maximizing model to the equal outcome model in 
reducing prediction errors. The calculation of the modified reduction-in-error statistic, I, 
is shown: 
I= PoW!v!M - PEoM 
1-pEOM 
(33) 
The reduction-in-error index, I, multiplied by 100 is the percentage fewer prediction 
errors using the owner wealth maximizing model instead of the equal outcome model. 
The analysis of the cost of using the equal outcome model also includes a 
comparison of the dollar amount of loan defaults missed by the owner wealth maximizing 
model and by the equal outcome model. This is a simple comparison and does not 
involve statistical testing. 
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4. Comparison of the Empirical Models to a Pure Chance Model in Loan 
Default Prediction 
The predictive validity of each model's classification versus a pure chance model 
is measured using the proportional chance criterion (Huberty (1984) and Wilson and 
Sharda (1994)). Each loan is classified as a predicted default or non-default as described 
in the previous section. The correct prediction rates are recorded and compared to the 
correct prediction rate that could be expected by pure chance. The proportional chance 
criterion (PCC) is based on the principle that one can achieve a correct prediction rate 
equal to the proportions in the sample. For example, if the sample consists of 10 percent 
defaulted loans and 90 percent non-defaulted loans one can achieve a 90 percent correct 
prediction rate by predicting none of the loans will default. The proportional chance 
criterion test statistic is distributed standard normal and is calculated as: 
PCC= O-E.fii 
~E(N-E) 
where O represents the total number of correct predictions, E is the total correct 
predictions obtainable by chance, and N is the total number of observations. 
(34) 
The reduction-in-error index is also used to compare the performance of the two 
empirical models to a pure chance model. The reduction-in-error index is computed as 
shown: 
I= PMODEL - PcHANCE 
1- PcHANCE 
(35) 
where PMoDEL is the correct prediction rate for the owner wealth maximizing model or the 




A. Diagnostic Tests on the Regression Models 
Diagnostic tests include an evaluation of the effect of outlier observations, tests 
for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. The diagnostic tests are performed on the 
owner wealth maximizing model and the equal outcome model using both the loan 
application and loan default datasets. 
The analysis of outlier observations on the model indicates the presence of several 
outlier observations in both datasets. The outlier observations do not appear to be the 
result of errors in the data. Therefore, they are retained in the sample. 
Testing for multicollinearity focuses on the correlation coefficients for the 
independent variables. The correlation coefficients for the independent variables are 
shown in Table IV for both datasets. The only correlation coefficient above .5 is the 
correlation coefficient for credit history is a positive factor with employment is a positive 
factor in the loan default dataset. The majority of the correlation coefficients are below 
.10. 
Gujarati (1995) outlines the consequences of multicollinearity. Models that have 
a high degree of multicollinearity may exhibit the following symptoms: (1) precise 
estimation may be difficult due to large variances and covariances, (2) due to large 
variances, the null hypothesis is more likely to be accepted, (3) individual t-ratios tend to 
be statistically insignificant, although the R2 may be very high, and (4) the estimators and 
their standard errors may be sensitive to small changes in the data. The models used in 
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TABLE IV 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Loan Application Dataset: 
Loan to value ratio 
Credit history is positive factor 
Previous loan default 
· Mortgage payment to average rent 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 
Employment is positive factor 
Neighborhood vacancy rate (>5%) 
Loan to value ratio 
Credit history is positive factor 
Previous loan default 
Mortgage payment to average rent 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 
Employment is positive factor 
Neighborhood vacancy rate (>5%) 
Loan to value ratio 
Credit history is positive factor 
Previous loan default 
Mortgage payment to average rent 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 
Employment is positive factor 








































































TABLE IV ( continued) 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Loan Default Dataset: 
Loan to value ratio 
Credit history is positive factor 
Mortgage payment to average rent 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 
Employment is positive factor 
Neighborhood vacancy rate (>5%) 
Loan to value ratio 
Credit history is positive factor 
Mortgage payment to average rent 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 
Employment is positive factor 
Neighborhood vacancy rate (>5%) 
Loan to value ratio 
Credit history is positive factor 
Employment is positive factor 
Mortgage payment to average rent 
Liquid assets to mortgage payment 
Residual income to mortgage 
payment 

































































this research do not exhibit any of these symptoms. Therefore, it appears that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
Testing for heteroscedasticity in logit models is not well developed. This research 
uses the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test (Gujarati (1995)). The residuals are used to 




Another variable, p, is constructed as the ratio between the squared error and the variance 





The variable, p, is used as the dependent variable in an OLS regression model where the 
independent variables are the same as the independent variables in the original regression 
model. The output from the regression on p is used to calculate the test statistic, 
Yi(Model sum of squares). The test statistic is distributed chi-square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of independent variables in the model minus one. 
The owner wealth maximizing model has heteroscedastic error terms using both 
datasets. For the loan application data, the model sum of squares is 3 3. 96 and the 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test statistic is 16.98 (significant at the .05 level). For the loan 
default data, the model sum of squares is 1238 and the test statistic is 619 (significant at 
the .0001 level). 
The equal outcome model does not exhibit heteroscedastic error terms using the 
loan application data, but heteroscedasticity is present using the loan default data. For the 
loan application data, the model sum of squares is 1.5 and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
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test statistic is . 7 5 (not significant at the .10 level). For the loan default data, the model 
sum of squares is 1568 and the test statistic is 784 (significant at the .0001 level). 
Several data transformations were attempted to remove or reduce the degree of 
heteroscedasticity. Data transformations attempted include (1) square root transformation 
(dividing through by the square root of the independent variable most likely to be causing 
the heteroscedasticity), and (2) inverse transformation. Both of the transformations 
increased the degree ofheteroscedasticity. Therefore, the original model is used. 
B. Model Fit 
One standard measure used to evaluate model fit in regression models is the 
coefficient of multiple determination, R2• Gujarati (1995) and Aldrich and Nelson (1984) 
argue that R2 is of little practical use in models with qualitative dependent variables. An 
alternative test of model fit is the likelihood ratio test (Gujarati (1995)). The likelihood 
ratio test involves maximizing the likelihood function without any parameter restrictions, 
and then with restrictions that the coefficients in the model are all equal to zero. The test 
statistic, A, is computed as shown: 
A = 2(ULLF - RLLF), 
where ULLF is the log of the unrestricted likelihood function and RLLF is the log of the 
restricted likelihood function. The test statistic is distributed chi-square with degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of restrictions in the restricted model. This chi-square test 
statistic is computed for the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal outcome 
model for both datasets to evaluate model fit. 
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1. Results of the Empirical Loan Default Models 
a. Owner Wealth Maximizing Model 
The results of the owner wealth maximizing model on the loan default data are 
shown in Table V. The chi-square test statistic for the overall model fit is significant at 
the . 0001 level. 
The independent variables in the owner wealth maximizing model all have the 
expected sign except for the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average 
neighborhood rent. The theoretical model indicates higher values of this ratio should be 
positively related to loan default, but the empirical results _indicate higher values are 
negatively related to loan default. The ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the 
average neighborhood rent represents the gross monthly mortgage payment, not the net 
payment. The net payment is the gross payment minus the tax benefits derived from 
making the payments. The net payment could not be computed for individual borrowers 
due to a lack of information on the tax brackets of individual borrowers. However, the 
tax benefit increases as the monthly mortgage payment increases. Therefore, the 
discrepancy in the expected sign and the observed sign on the ratio of the monthly 
mortgage payment to the average neighborhood rent may be the result of tax benefits 
associated with homeownership. 
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TABLEV 
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE LOAN DEFAULT DATA 
Owner Wealth Maximizing Model: 
Parameter Standard Chi-Square 
Estimate Error Test Statistic P-Value 
Intercept - 1.311 0.800 2.69 .1013 
Loan to value ratio 2.645 0.768 11.85 .0006 
Credit history is positive 
factor - 3.287 0.242 184.42 <.0001 
Mortgage payment to 
average rent - 0.370 0.064 33.17 <.0001 
Liquid assets to mortgage 
payment - 0.027 0.004 55.15 <.0001 
Residual income to 
mortgage payment - 0.001 0.026 0.01 .9704 
Employment is positive 
factor - 2.344 0.170 190.48 <.0001 
Neighborhood vacancy 
rate (>5%) 0.217 0.071 9.42 .0021 
The Chi-Square test statistic for the overall model fit is 1883 with 7 degrees of freedom 
(p<.0001). 
Equal Outcome Model: 
Parameter Standard Chi-Square 
Estimate Error Test Statistic P-Value 
Intercept 1.059 0.138 59.05 <.0001 
Residual income to 
mortgage payment 0.009 0.024 0.14 .7130 
Mortgage payment to 
average rent - 0.368 0.061 36.73 <.0001 
Employment is positive 
factor 3.609 0.158 523.65 <.0001 
The Chi-Square test statistic for the overall model fit is 1341.5 with 2 degrees of freedom 
(p<.0001). 
153 
All of the variables in the owner wealth maximizing model are significant at the 
.01 level except the ratio of residual income to the monthly mortgage payment. The p-
value for the ratio of residual income to the monthly mortgage payment is .9704. 
b. Equal Outcome Model 
The results of the equal outcome model on the loan default data are shown in 
Table V. The chi-square test statistic for the overall model fit is significant at the .0001 
level. The ratio of the mortgage payment to average neighborhood rent and the dummy 
variable that reflects employment history as a positive compensating factor are significant 
at the .0001 level with the expected signs. The ratio of residual income to the mortgage 
payment is not statistically significant. 
2. Results of the Empirical Loan Application Models 
a. Owner Wealth Maximizing Model 
The results of the owner wealth maximizing model on the loan application data 
are shown in Table VI. The chi-square test statistic for overall model fit is significant at 
the .0001 level. 
Only four of the empirical variables in the owner wealth maximizing model are 
significant at the .05 level. The four variables that are significant all have the expected 
sign. The variables that are significant at the ;OS level are (1) the loan to value ratio, (2) 
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TABLE VI 
LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE LOAN APPLICATION DATA 
Owner Wealth Maximizing Model: 
Parameter Standard Chi-Square 
Estimate Error Test Statistic P-Value 
Intercept ·4.865 1.032 22.21 <.0001 
Loan to value ratio - 2.289 1.130 4.10 .0429 
Credit history is positive 
factor 1.084 0.482 5.07 .0244 
Previous loan default - 1.255 0.244 26.46 <.0001 
Mortgage payment to 
average rent - 0.378 0.161 5.52 .0188 
Liquid assets to mortgage 
payment 0.003 0.003 1.00 .3160 
Residual income to 
mortgage payment - 0.018 0.066 0.07 .7889 
Employment is positive 
factor 0.086 0.244. 0.13 .7234 
Neighborhood vacancy 
rate (>5%) - 0.402 0.225 3.20 .0735 
The Chi-Square test statistic for the overall model fit is 56.1 with 7 degrees of freedom 
(p<.0001). 
Equal Outcome Model: 
Parameter Standard Chi-Square 
Estimate Error Test Statistic P-Value 
Intercept 2.561 0.264 94.29 <.0001 
Residual income to 
mortgage payment 0.026 0.063 0.16 .6851 
Mortgage payment to 
average rent - 0.219 0.155 1.98 .1593 
Employment is positive 
factor 0.062 0.237 0.07 .7939 
The Chi-Square test statistic for the overall model fit is 2.07 with 2 degrees of freedom 
(p=.5587). 
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the credit history is a positive factor dummy variable, (3) the previous loan default 
dummy variable, and ( 4) the ratio of the mortgage payment to average rent. 
b. Equal Outcome Model 
The results of the equal outcome model on the loan application data are shown in 
Table VI. The chi-square test statistic for overall model fit is insignificant. None of the 
independent variables in the model are significant at the .10 level. 
C. Results of Hypothesis Tests 
1. Hypothesis One: The Test for Heterogeneous Credit Quality in the 
Borrowing Population 
Hypothesis one uses the owner wealth maximizing model and the loan default 
dataset to test whether the borrowing population is homogeneous or heterogeneous with 
respect to race. The following logit regression model is used on the loan default data to 
predict the probability of default for each loan: 
lo~1~ 1J =b, +b,x, +e, 
where, 
Pi = PROB(Yi = 1 I xi), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan defaulted and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or appraised value, 
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(2) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant's credit history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
(3) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(4) the ratio of the borrower's liquid assets to the mortgage payment, 
(5) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, 
(6) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, and 
(7) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds 5 percent 
and O otherwise. 
The probability of default, P;, for each observation, is used as the dependent 
variable in an ordinary least squares regression model to determine if the borrower's race 
is a significant explanatory factor on the probability of default. The OLS regression 
model is shown: 
P(DEFAULT) = b0 +b,RACE+e 
where P(DEFAULT) for each observation is equal to P; from the previous equation and 
RACE equals 1 if the borrower is black and zero if the borrower is white. 
If the coefficient on RACE is positive and significant, the average credit quality of 
black borrowers is less than the average credit quality of white borrowers. This would be 
evidence in support of the alternative hypothesis that the distribution of credit quality is 
heterogeneous with respect to race. The following empirical hypothesis is used to test 
whether the borrowing population is homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to race: 
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H0 : b1 ~ 0, 
HA: bl> 0. 
The test results for hypothesis one are shown in Table VII. The parameter 
estimate on RACE is .1061 and is significant at the .000 I level. The null hypothesis is 
rejected. The results support the alternative hypothesis that white borrowers, on 
average, have a higher distribution of credit quality than black borrowers. This 
indicates that the equal outcome model should reduce racial disparities in lending and 
that equal outcome lending should have a cost. 
2. Hypothesis Two: Racial Disparities in Lending Decisions 
Hypothesis two tests the effectiveness of the equal outcome model in reducing 
racial disparities in lending decisions. This hypothesis is tested using the loan application 
data. A logit regression model is used to calculate the probability ofloan approval, Pi, 
for each loan application using the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal 
outcome model. The logit model specification for the owner wealth maximizing model is 
shown: 
where, 
Pi= PROBC:vi = 1 I Xi), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan was approved and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or appraised value, 
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TABLE VII 
RESULTS OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS 











Hypothesis Two: P(APPROVE) = bQ + b1RACE + e 
Owner Wealth Maximizing Model: 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 0.9296 0.0018 
Race - 0.0479 0.0051 
Equal Outcome Model: 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error 
Intercept 0.9235 0.0003 














(p < .0001) 
Hypothesis Three: {DEFAULT-P(DEFAULT)}2 = bQ + b1MODEL + e 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate Error t-Statistic 
Intercept 0.1933 0.0024 80.7 














(2) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant's credit history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
(3) a dummy variable that equals I if the borrower had a history ofloan defaults and 0 
otherwise, 
(4) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
( 5) the ratio of the borrower's liquid assets to the mortgage payment, 
(6) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, 
(7) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, and 
(8) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds.5 percent 
and O otherwise. 
The logit model specification for the equal outcome model is: 
]ogC ~ JJ = b0 +b;X; +e, 
where, 
Pi = PROB(Jli = 1 I Xi), 
Yi equals I if the loan was approved and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(2) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, and 
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(3) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise. 
The probability of loan approval, Pi, is calculated for each observation and used 
as the dependent variable in an ordinary least squares regression model to determine if the 
applicant's race is a significant explanatory factor on the probability ofloan approval. 
Two separate regressions are used; one using the probability of loan approval, Pi, for 
each observation calculated using the owner wealth maximizing model and the other 
using the probability of loan approval, Pi, for each observation calculated using the equal 
outcome model. The OLS regression models are shown: 
P(APPROVE) =b0 +b1RACE +e, and 
P(APPROVE) = b; +b; RACE +e°, 
where P(APPROVE) for each observation is equal to Pi from the owner wealth 
maximizing model or the equal outcome model, b0 , b1 , and e are the intercept, coefficent 
on RACE, and error term, respectively, from the owner wealth maximizing model, and 
b;, b;, and e • are the intercept, coefficient on RACE, and error term, respectively, from 
the equal outcome model. 
If minority borrowers have, on average, lower probabilities of loan approval, the 
coefficient on RACE will be significant and negative. If the equal outcome model 
reduces the racial disparity in lending decisions, the coefficient on RACE should be 
greater (less negative) for the equal outcome model than for the owner wealth 
maximizing model. The empirical hypothesis is shown: 
H0 : b/ :S b1, 
HA: b/ > b1, 
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The parameter estimates b1 • and b1 and their variances are used to calculate a t-statistic to 
test for differences in the value ofb1° and b1 (Levin and Rubin (1998)): 
b *-b 
f = I I 
Sb "-b 
I I 
where b1 • is the coefficient on RACE for the equal outcome model, b1 is the coefficient on 
RACE for the owner wealth maximizing model, and the pooled standard error is: 
S 2 2 b•b = sb.+sb I - I I I 
where s;,. is the variance for b1 * and s;1 is the variance for b1• 
A positive and significant t-statistic indicates the equal outcome model results in 
less racial disparity in lending decisions than the owner wealth maximizing model. 
Therefore, if the t-statistic is positive and significant, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis. 
The results of the OLS regression model used to test hypothesis two and the t-test 
to test if the coefficients on RACE are the same for both models are shown in Table VII. 
The parameter estimate on RACE is negative and significant for the owner wealth 
maximizing model. The RACE coefficient is not statistically significant for the equal 
outcome model. This indicates the equal outcome model does not produce significantly 
different probabilities ofloan approval for white and black applicants. The t-test statistic 
indicates the parameter estimate on RACE is much greater (less negative) for the equal 
outcome model than for the owner wealth maximizing model. The t-statistic of 9.25 is 
significant at the .0001 level. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. The evidence 
supports the alternative hypothesis that the equal outcome model results in less racial 
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disparity than the owner wealth maximizing model. 
3. Hypothesis Three: Performance of the Models in Loan Default Prediction 
Hypothesis three tests for differences in default prediction performance between 
the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal outcome model. This hypothesis is 
tested using the loan default dataset. A logit regression model is used to calculate the 
probability of default for each loan using the owner wealth maximizing model and the 
equal outcome model. The logit model specification for the owner wealth maximizing 
model is: 
where, 
Pi= PROB(yi = 11 x;), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan defaulted and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the loan amount to the lower of the purchase price or appraised value, 
(2) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the applicant's credit history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, 
(3) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(4) the ratio of the borrower's liquid assets to the mortgage payment, 
( 5) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, 
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(6) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise, and 
(7) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the neighborhood vacancy rate exceeds 5 percent 
and O otherwise. 
The logit model specification for the equal outcome model is: 
]ogL ~ 1J-b, +b;X; + e, 
where, 
Pi= PROB(vi = 1 J x;), 
Yi equals 1 if the loan defaulted and O otherwise, 
and Xi is a vector of the following explanatory variables: 
(1) the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the 
neighborhood, 
(2) the ratio of the borrower's residual income to the mortgage payment, and 
(3) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the borrower's employment history was a positive 
compensating factor in the loan decision and O otherwise. 
The probability of default, Pi, for each observation and model are saved and 
recorded. The squared differences in the actual value of the dependent variable, 
DEFAULT, and the probability of default, P(DEFAULT), are used as the dependent 
variable in the following ordinary least squares regression model: 
{DEFAULT-P(DEFAULT)}2 = b0 + b1MODEL + e 
where P(DEFAULT) for each observation is equal to Pi calculated from the logit 
regression equations presented earlier, and MODEL equals 1 if the probability of default, 
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P(DEF AULT), is from the owner wealth maximizing model and zero if the probability of 
default is from the equal outcome model. If the owner wealth maximizing model reduces 
the error in measuring the probability of default, the coefficient on MODEL should be 
less than zero. The empirical hypothesis used to test hypothesis three is shown: 
H0 : b1 ?: 0, 
HA: b1 <O. 
The results of the OLS regression model used to test hypothesis three are shown 
in Table VII. The parameter estimate on MODEL is -.0234 and is significant at the .0001 
level. This indicates the squared prediction errors are significantly lower for the owner 
wealth maximizing model than for the equal outcome model. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that the owner 
wealth maximizing model predicts loan defaults more accurately than the equal outcome 
model. 
D. The Cost of Using the Equal Outcome Model 
The findings for hypothesis three indicate that the equal outcome model has larger 
errors in predicting loan default performance than the owner wealth maximizing model. 
Additional tests are conducted to determine if the owner wealth maximizing model 
. results in fewer prediction errors when used to forecast whether or not the borrower will 
default. Based on the findings in hypothesis three, it is expected that the owner wealth 
maximizing model will have fewer prediction errors than the equal outcome model. 
The probability of default, Pi, for each observation and model are used to 
determine if the loan is predicted to default or not default. Observations with a 
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probability of default, Pi, greater than .5 are predicted to default, while observations with 
a probability of default less than .5 are predicted not to default. The predicted outcomes 
are compared to the actual outcomes. The proportion of loans correctly classified is 
recorded for both empirical models. The following t-test is conducted to determine if the 
owner wealth maximizing model predicts loan defaults more accurately than the equal 
outcome model: 
1 = PoWMM - PEOM 
s 
POWMM-PEOM 
where PoWMM is the correct prediction rate for the owner wealth maximizing model, PEoM 
is the correct prediction rate for the equal outcome model, and 
where IloWMM is the sample size used with the owner wealth maximizing model, nEoM is 
the sample size used with the equal outcome model, and 
p = noWMMPoWMM + nEOMPEOM 
noWMM +nEOM 
Results of the t-test for differences in the default prediction accuracy of the owner 
wealth maximizing model and the equal outcome model are shown in Table VIII. The t-
statistic is 5.16 and is significant at the .0001 level. This indicates the owner wealth 
maximizing model outperforms the equal outcome model in distinguishing good loans 
from bad loans. 
Another measure is calculated to determine how much better the owner wealth 
maximizing model is than the equal outcome model in classifying good and bad loans. 
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TABLE VIII 
TESTS COMP ARING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TWO MODELS 
AND A PURE CHANCE MODEL IN LOAN DEFAULT PREDICTION 
The Cost of Using the Equal outcome model: 
Correct prediction rate for the Owner Wealth Maximizing Model = .736 
Correct prediction rate for the Equal outcome model = .689 
.736-.689 
t = .0091 = 5.16 (p < .0001) 
Reduction-in-error index (I): 
I= .736-.689 = _151 
1-.689 
Comparison of the Empirical Loan Default Models to a Pure Chance Model: 
Owner Wealth Maximizing Model: 
Proportional Chance Criterion (PCC): 
PCC = 3680-2500.J2500 = 33.4 (p < .0001) 
~2500(5000 - 2500) 
Reduction-in-error index (I): 
Equal outcome model: 
I= .736-.5 = .472 
1-.5 
Proportional Chance Criterion (PCC): 
PCC = 3443-2500"'5ooo = 26.7 (p < .0001) 
~2500(5000 - 2500) 
Reduction-in-error index (I): 
I= .689-5 = .378 
1-.5 
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The reduction-in-error index (Klecka (1980), Huberty (1984) and Wilson and Sharda 
(1994) has been used to compare the performance of various models to pure chance 
models. With a slight modification, the reduction~in-error index can be used to compare 
the performance of the owner wealth maximizing model to the equal outcome model in 
reducing prediction errors. The calculation of the modified reduction-in-error statistic, I, 
is shown: 
I = PoWMM - PEOM 
l- PEOM 
The reduction-in-error index, I, multiplied by 100 is the percentage fewer prediction 
errors using the owner wealth maximizing model instead of the equal outcome model. 
As shown in Table VIII, using the owner wealth maximizing model results in 15.1 
percent fewer prediction errors than using the equal outcome model. This provides 
additional support for the conclusion that the owner wealth maximizing model performs 
better in predicting loan defaults than the equal outcome model. 
The analysis of the cost of using the equal outcome model also includes a 
comparison of the dollar amount of loan defaults missed by the owner wealth maximizing 
model and by the equal outcome model. This is a simple comparison and does not 
involve statistical testing. 
The sample of 5,000 loans includes 2,500 that defaulted. The owner wealth 
maximizing model misclassified 1,320 loans, totaling $86,301,494. The equal outcome 
model misclassified 1,557 loans, totaling $99,507,963. For the data used in this research, 
the cost of using the equal outcome model is that 237 more loans, totaling $13,206,469, 
are misclassified than using the owner wealth maximizing model. 
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E. Comparison of the Empirical Models to a Pure Chance Model in Loan 
Default Prediction 
The predictive validity of each model's classification versus a pure chance model 
is measured using the proportional chance criterion (Huberty (1984) and Wilson and 
Sharda (1994)). Each loan is classified as a predicted default or non-default as described 
earlier. The correct prediction rates are recorded and compared to the correct prediction 
rate that could be expected by pure chance. The proportional chance criterion (PCC) is 
based on the principle that one can achieve a correct prediction rate equal to the 
proportions in the sample. For example,ifthe sample consists of 10 percent defaulted 
loans and 90 percent non-defaulted loans one can achieve a 90 percent correct prediction 
rate by predicting none of the loans will default. The proportional chance criterion test 
statistic is distributed standard normal and is calculated as: 
PCC= O-EJN 
~E(N-E) 
where O represents the total number of correct predictions, E is the total correct 
predictions obtainable by chance, and N is the total number of observations. 
The reduction-in-error index is also used to compare the performance of the two 
empirical models to a pure chance model. The reduction-in-error index is computed as 
shown: 
I = PMODEL - PcHANCE 
1- PcHANCE 
where PMoDEL is the correct prediction rate for the owner wealth maximizing model or the 
equal outcome model and PcHANcE is the correct prediction rate obtainable by pure chance. 
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The results of the tests comparing the owner wealth maximizing model and the 
equal outcome model to a pure chance model are shown in Table VIII. The results 
indicate both the owner wealth maximizing model and the equal outcome model 
outperform a pure chance model. 
The owner wealth maximizing model results in 4 7 .2 percent fewer prediction 
errors than a pure chance model. The Proportional Chance Criterion test statistic of 33.4 
is significant at the .0001 level. 
The equal outcome model results in 37.8 percent fewer prediction errors than a 
pure chance model. The Proportional Chance,Criterion test statistic of26.7 is significant 
at the .0001 level. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Conclusions 
This research explores the possibility of developing an owner wealth maximizing 
lending model that will accurately assess credit risk without producing racial disparities 
in lending decisions. The empirical test results indicate that such a model probably does 
not exist bec~use of the correlation of race with key economic characteristics of 
individual loan applicants. The findings indicate the distribution of credit quality is 
higher, on average, for white borrowers than for black borrowers. 
Given that the ideal credit decision model doesn't exist, the research focuses on 
the tradeoffs between using a lending model that maximizes owner wealth and one that 
produces equal outcomes for white and black applicants. The empirical equal outcome 
model results in significantly less racial disparity in lending decisions than the owner 
wealth maximizing model. 
While the equal outcome model reduces the racial disparity in lending decisions, 
there is a cost involved in using the equal outcome model. Policymakers should consider 
this cost as they move forward with performance-based measures in evaluating banks' 
lending efforts to minorities. If performance based measures lead to equal outcome 
lending, lenders may be forced to make loan decisions using inferior loan models. The 
equal outcome model in this research performed better than expected, but is still 
significantly worse than the owner wealth maximizing model in classifying good and bad 
loans. 
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Policymakers want to end racial discrimination in lending and that is an admirable 
and important goal. However, it will be difficult to remove statistical discrimination from 
the lending process because wealth maximizing lenders have an incentive to use any 
variable that they associate with creditworthiness in their lending model. Several of the 
variables associated with creditworthiness are correlated with race. If lenders include a 
variable in their model that is associated with creditworthiness that is correlated with 
race, the variable will have a disproportionate impact on minority applicants. It is 
difficult to disentangle discriminatory lending practices and owner wealth maximizing 
lending practices. One important first step in doing this is to verify that variables used in 
the loan decision model are based on some reasonable economic theory of the borrower's 
default decision and that empirically they are accurate measures of default risk. 
B. Contributions of This Research 
This investigation makes several contributions to the area of loan default and loan 
discrimination research. A key contribution of this research is the development of a new 
model of the borrower's default decision, which is incorporated into a loan decision 
model. The loan decision model was tested with loan default data to determine if the 
model can accurately assess credit risk before applying it to loan application data. 
This research is the first attempt to validate a loan decision model by determining 
if the model accurately predicts loan defaults. Previous research identified variables the 
authors hypothesized to be important which were tested to determine if they explained 
loan approvals and denials. This investigation tests the loan decision model on loan 
default data first to verify that the model can accurately assess credit risk. It is important 
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to determine that the model used in the loan decision process can accurately classify good 
and bad loans. 
C. Limitations of This Research 
The credit decision model developed in this research applies only to fixed-rate 
residential mortgage loans. It cannot be extended to adjustable-rate mortgage loans 
without significant revisions. 
The findings for hypotheses one and three are limited to the U.S. lending market 
for single-family fixed rate residential mortgage loans. The findings for hypothesis two 
are limited to the Boston Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
Data constraints made it difficult to proxy some of the factors in the theoretical 
model. The accuracy of the findings of this research are based on the assumption that the 
theoretical variables that could not be proxied would not drastically influence the 
empirical results. 
D. Recommendations 
Further research should be directed to extending the investigation of hypothesis 
two to other lending markets. A major problem with extending the investigation of 
hypothesis two to other lending markets is that the data needed to do so is generally not 
available. 
Further research is also needed in the development of a credit decision model for 
adjustable-rate mortgage loans. Adjustable-rate mortgage loans play a prominent role in 
financing home mortgages. Developing a model for adjustable-rate single-family 
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residential mortgage loans is difficult for several reasons. First, the monthly mortgage 
payment changes as interest rates change. The impact of this on the borrower's default 
decision may be dramatic. With an adjustable-rate mortgage, changes in interest rates 
result in changes in several of the empirical variables used in this research. For example, 
an increase in interest rates leads to higher monthly mortgage payments. Higher monthly 
mortgage payments result in changes in (1) the ratio of liquid assets to the mortgage 
payment, (2) the ratio of residual income to the mortgage payment, and (3) the ratio of 
the monthly mortgage payment to the average monthly rental rate for the neighborhood. 
Interest rate changes should play a significant role in the borrower's default decision on 
adjustable-rate mortgage loans, therefore any credit decision model of adjustable-rate 
mortgages must account for interest rate changes. 
Finally, additional research is needed on the borrower specific characteristics that 
influence the probability of default. The loan underwriting guidelines used by major 
underwriters should be tested on loan default data to determine if all of the factors used in 
making loan decisions accurately measure default risk. If some of the factors are not 
good measures of default risk and the measures are correlated with race, the underwriting 
guidelines will have an unwarranted disproportionate impact on minority applicants. 
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